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Purpose of Study. The economical use of school funds 
raised by taxation is quite essential for the welfare of 
our country. There has been considerable waste of funds in 
the past through carelessness, corruptness, and lack of 
information concerning our statutes prescribing the procedure 
of spending public funds.
It is the purpose of this study to bring together all 
the information obtainable on the subject of awarding school 
contracts by the procedure of advertising for bids as pre­
scribed in the state statutes of the several states and the 
Supreme Court decisions relating to the bids, so all who are 
interested may secure under one cover the collection of 
information gathered from many sources.
Nature of Study and Limitations. This study does not 
deal with that phase of advertising for the sale of bonds 
or certificates of indebtedness. It is intended to treat 
only those contracts calling for services or materials such 
as, building or construction contracts, contracts for repair­
ing, improving, furnishings, equipment, supplies, textbooks, 
busses and fuel.
Procedure. The information contained herein has been 
gathered from the sources listed in the bibliography, which 
includes the general sohool statutes and supplement from all
2
of the state® of the United States, the three edition® of the
American Digest, the seven district II sport or s, miscellaneous
state reports, and law encyclopedias* Court case® found in
the above list were briefed and used as the basis for
1summarizing and illustrating in this study*
Other aftu&jjaa sSk hide.* In a thesis “Judicial Decisions 
Relating to Contractual Powers of School Boards,* by James 
•ilfrod Smith, at tho University of Chicago. Chapter XX has 
referred to five of tho Supreme Court decisions on the bid 
procedure of awarding contracts that are incorporated in this 
study. He ha® given a general discussion of this phase of 
contracts Insofar as there is a relationship, but he did not 
attempt to go into details.
Arthur S* Traxler has an artiolo “The Law Governing The
2Making of Contract© for the Construction of School Buildings,* 
presenting the court decisions relating to the raost important 
controversial issues, restricting his discussion to construct­
ion of buildings only. He ha® sited, twenty supreme court 
oases of the ninety-five referred to in the bibliography of 
this study. Traxler merely .gave a brief summary of the 
general rules and regulations applicable to contracts for 
architects' services, letting contract when sealed proposals 
are required, bidding on indefinite sped float ions, contracts
^Koy Humber 50(2). in American Digest
2jmS±9J£k M m k  Jan. 193̂ , Vol. CS-89, *>• 0̂
3
with a higher bidder, reservation of right to reject bids, 
what constitutes a contract, changes in specifications, 
erroneous bids, and bring action for illegal contract.
There is very little duplication and as the article 
Is so incomplete; the writer feels that there is a lot left 
to be done in presenting the views of the Supreme Court 
decisions on all phases of the bid procedure; on supplies, 
textbooks, repairs, improvements, furnishings, equipment, 




Construction Contracts. In studying the general school 
laws of all the states, there are twenty-eight states regulat­
ing the construction of schoolhouses in requiring that 
competitive bidding be employed. Seventeen states require all 
expenditures ranging from over $25 to over $1,000 to require 
bids. The most of these set the amount at “'500, they are 
California, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, New Jersey, Nevada, Minnesota, 
Oregon and South Dakota; North Dakota requires all expenditures 
over 200 to be let to the lowest responsible bidder. Seven­
teen state statutes prescribe that all awards upon competitive 
bidding shall be to the lowest responsible bidder. Nevada 
states that award be made to the lowest and best bidder.
Contracts for Supplies. There are only three states,
District of Columbia, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania that have 
special sections relating to supplies. Usually supplies are 
included in the sections dealing with expenditures over a 
specified sum.
Textbooks. Ten states have textbook commissions which 
are required to make adoption upon bids submitted by the 
publishers.
Fuel*. There are only four states having sections specifically 
requiring oontraots for coal to be awarded upon competitive 
bids, they are District of Columbia, New Jersey, Oregon and
5
North Dakota on lignite.
1 ussee. As far as the writer could disoover in this study 
North Dakota is the only state having a law requiring the award 
of contracts to the lowest responsible bidder for bus drivers 
in the transportation of children to school.
Court Decisions. The District of Columbia and the nine­
teen states, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, 
Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Nevada,
North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, 
Virginia, West Virginia and Louisiana, have never had a oase 
involving this particular subjeot of bids tried in their 
courts, of which twelve have no statute bearing on the subject 
of bids.
Common Practice. Even though there are no statutes in 
some states on competitive bidding in the awarding of school 
contracts, most of the statutes practice this method of 
procedure in awarding contracts involving a large expenditure.
STATE STATUTES ON BID PROCEDURE
Stajtge--- Rldgs,kooks Ov^r il±cae.es Reference In Statutes
Alabama X . 2
Arizona X X
Arkansas X 1
California X X 500 4
ColoradoConnecticut
Dist. of Col. X 25Delaware X 500 1
Florida X XGeorgia X
Idaho 500Illinois 1
Indiana 3Iowa X X 500 2
Kansas 500
Kentucky 3MaineLouisiana 500Mass. lMaryland X 1000 l
Michigan X 2Minnesota 500 5Miss.
Missouri X 3Montana 250 2Nebraska 2New HampshireNew Jersey X 500 1 2New Mexioo X X 500 1Nevada X 500New York 1000 12North Carolina
North Dakota X 200 2
Ohio 1000 10Oklahoma X l
Oregon 500
Pennsylvania 300 10Rhode Island
South CarolinaSouth Dakota 500Tennessee X 100 1Texas X 1Utah X X 3VermontVirginia
Washington 300 1lest Virginia XWisconsin 1000 1Wyoming 200 1
1924 Art 23 Sec 365-4o4 
1931 Art 7 Sec 10*4-9, 2605 
369 
)12
Eill #71 Sec 12 
Chap 21
I 93I  Sec 1927 Sec1933, 193 1931, 193 1927 Title 301931, 1935 Sec 11 193^, 1935 Sec 203 1933 Sec 37-45 1931 Sec oS 
193*4- 1931
1929 Sec *4451,  4-370 
1927 Sec 195, 193519301931 ,
1932, 34- Act 73, Sec19301933 Ch 226 Sec 59A1931 Sec 73SS 1935 Sec 91-9219301933 Sec 9^91 1927 Sec 1016 
1929 Sec 731931
1925 Sec 65-66 1931 Seo 144 I 927 Sec 2
1934 Sec 675 1923, 1927 1931 Sec 1340 Ch1925 Sec 7633,2362 1933 (C.L.) 1909 Sec 8027 1927(Sec 35-1331,S - L .1931) 1933 Sec 617
1929
1929 Sec 73S4 
1927 H .B . 567 1933 ( S t .1914 Art 2644 1931 Sec 4639,4556 
1929 
1929






Jtffi :th of Time to Advertise* The length of time that an 
advertisement must be published varies according to the statutes 
in the states and somewhat on the type of contract to be awarded.
The most common requirement among the states is two weehs 
for construction work, and expenditures involving an amount 
greater t an the limit prescribed by the statute. In the 
adoption of textbooks, advertising fox thirty day® is quite 
common although California requires sixty days* notice. In a 
few instances ten days are all that the statute requires but 
specifies publication in two issues of a weekly newspaper. 
Ocasslonally one publication one week previous to the opening 
of the bids is all that is required.
It is advised that one should study his own state statute 
to learn the le al requirement® applicable to his home state 
as no general rule will apply. Those state® requiring two 
weeks publication in contracts involving an expenditure over 
a certain amount are: California, Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri and Montana.
1
North bakota 1 ;.eauir.ement_g. North Dakota requires thirty 
days notice in which three successive weekly insertions appear 
in building school houses, applicable to all districts; ten
1 General School Laws 1931* ®c« Cfa. 35* 3®°» l**9^a3»
1S2S, Oh. 195* Oh. 23s.
8
days notice or one publication in a legal county newspaper for 
all expenditures of an aggregate amount greater than "300 other 
than a building contract; three weeks for the construction, 
remodeling, providing or furnishings, and equipment in special 
school districts; posting notice for ten days in three most 
public places for busses; and for lignite coal, advertisement 
shall be in a newspaper published in and having a general 
circulation in the state.
The first advertisement appearing in a newspaper need 
not necessarily be formally anproved by a board of education
4
previous to its apoearance if a board ratifies it subsequently2
as in the case Sohwitzer v. Board of Education, where the 
board formally authorized the advertisement the day following 
the insertion by the building committee.
Where the statute states no time or manner of advertise­
ment some form of reasonable nubile notice iu t be given. In 
New Mexico the statute required competitive bidding for
expenditures involving amounts greater than $500 but it did3
not describe the method of advertising. (Sec. 1581 has changed
4since, see 1931 Sec. 144.) In the case Mays v. Bassett the 
court held that it is implied from the nature of the statute 
that there should be notice, and notice means some manner of 
2-------------------Schwitzer v. Board of Education of City of Newark (1910)75 A. 447.3New Mexico 1931 Sec. 144 replaced Seo. 1581.
4Mays v. Be3sett (1912) 125 P. 609, 17 N. M. 193.
9
advertising.
Where Advertised. Advertisement must be in a newspaper
qualified to publish legal notices. This is usually one
published within the oity in which the work is to be done or
in one published in the county seat of the county in which the
work is to be done. If there are no such newspapers within
the county, then one in an adjacent county will serve, or any
newspaper within the state having general circulation in the
5
county where the work is to be done.
Language Used in Advertisement Should Be Clear and Definite.
The advertisement must be so worded that there will be no
doubt in the minds of reasonable men as to its meaning and
thus provide a common basis for competitive bidding. In
6
Maloney v, Maddever. the advertisement called for bids on 
1450 tons of *pure anthracite coal that will meet the govern­
ment test.* The question arose is, "Were the bidders sufficient­
ly informed to enter intelligent bids?'* It was held,'pure' 
meant separate from all heterogenous or extraneous matter and 
was not synonymous with “true or hard." A notice stating,
"That anthracite coal must meet the government test for such 
anthracite," was held sufficiently definite to meet the statutory
requirements for competitive bidding.
7
In Bibbs v. Arensberg. the specifications called for,g"*".- —.......... — ...........
New Mexico School Law 1931, Sec. 230.
®Maloney v. Maddever, et al (1912) 136 N. Y. S. 498, 77 Misc.
Rep. 340
^Hibbs et al v. Arensberg et al (1923) 119 A. 727, 276 Pa. 24.
10
"The free brick...to be a thoroughly vitrified, wire-cut, 
face brick of such oolor s will be selected by the architect 
and sohool board...to cost no more than $51 per thousand."
This was held sufficient for an intelligent bid because anyone 
in the contracting business should know the meaning of these
terms which are commonly used in their line of work.
8
Another case MoGreevey v. Board of Education is illust­
rative of this noint. MoGreevey presented a bid of 1215 
for the excavation for a schoolhouse. Uoon learning that the 
plan was drawn on the scale one eighth-inch equals one foot 
instead of one-fourth inch equalling one foot as he had 
believed, he was permitted to modify his bid to $1800, which 
was still the lowest bid. It was held that the bo rd and Mc- 
Greevey entered an illegal contract. There is no doubt in the 
minds of reasonable men but what the advertisement was 
sufficiently clear in this case when he was the only bidder to 
make this error.
Advert!-ements Should Contain All Essential Elements.
An advert!'ement should state when and where the plans, draw­
ings and specifications therefor may be seen and examined; 
the place where, and the day and the hour when the bids will 
be opened, and the closing date of accepting birs. It should 
reserve the right of the board to reject any and all bids; 
that a certified check on some acceptable solvent bank for
- T
MoGreevey v. Board of Ediication (1900) 20 Ohio Cir. Ct. 114.
100 C. D. 724.
11
not less than 5$, usually of the amount of the bid must
accompany the bid as a guarantee that the bidder will enter
Into the contract if his bid is 'ccepted.
A Filed After Closing; Date Illegal. A bid filed after
the date specified s the closing date cannot be considered
and any bid accepted thereafter is illegal. In State v. York9
County Commissioners. the commissioners awarded a contract to 
furnish the cotmty officers with books, blanks, nd stationery 
to one whose bid was filed January 10, when the bids should 
have been filed before J-nuary 1. The court held that the 
commissioners had no authority to consider a bid filed there­
after as the statute is mandatory, ’•lien a statute specifies 
a cert; in date it must not be disregarded. Also in state v. 
Cincinnati. the board accepted a bid after the date fixed 
in the advertisement and the court declared this an illegal 
bid. This was an attempt to submit a new bid including a 
Detroit Automatic Stoker and for installation of a heating 
and ventilating system after the first bids were opened and 
had been considered.
MIt is clear that the attempt to award the 
contract in this manner is wholly unauthorized, illegal and void, which upon proper application 
to a court of competent jurisdiction should be enjoined. Clearly discretion to reject all the 
bids refers to such bids as are received in pursu­
ance of the advertisement and cannot relate to an 
independent and wholly unauthorized bid received 
after the date fixed in the advertisement." ^9---------------------------------State of Nebraska ex rel Whedon v. Com'rs of York County(1883) 13 Neb. 57, 13 N. W. 816.
^°State ex rel Mathis Bros. Co. v. Board of Education (Cinn.
(1905) 37 Ohio Ct. R. 833.
13
Corrected Bid Filed After Closing Date Not Illegal.
If a bidder discovers and error after submitting a bid as in11
the case of Zimmerman v . Miller where a contractor handed in
a correction of his bid the day after time set for accepting
them, but before they were opened. It was held that the
board cannot refuse to accept a bid on the grounds that it
is an illegal bid and not accompanied by a certified check.
Such a bid is not considered a new bid accepted after the
date fixed in the advertisement, but an amendment or part to
be attched to his former bid. It was held to seem clear to
reasonable men that the board made a mistake in rejecting this
bid which complied with the intentions of the statutes.
Advertisement for a. Branded Product Not Illegal. If an
advertisement specifies a branded product such as advertising
for bids for installing the Monarch system of ventilation in
12
a sohoolhouse, as in the case of McBride v. Ashley, a
contract is not invalid and not in violation of statutes
preventing competitive bidding. It is clearly within the
discretion of a board to adopt any patented, copyrighted or
exclusively sold device which in their good judgment is the 13
best.
Adoption of Branded Product After Advertising Not Illegal. 
If an advertisement does not specify a particular brand, trade 
mark, or system, the board may afterwards adopt a particular 123
11Zimmermah et al v. Miller et al (1912) 85 A. 871, 237 Pa. 616
12McBride v. Ashley (1916) 154 N. Y. S. 1010, 91 Misc. Rep.
13North Dakota School Law, 1931 Ch. 235, Sec. 2.
suit was a verified account showing a balance due and unpaid.
The balance due was the amount of freight charges on shipments 
prepaid by the Cement Pro' nets Co. The board sought to evade 
the obligation on the ground that the oontract was illegal 
in not obeying the statute in respect to advertisin' for 
competitive bidding. It was held not to invalidate the 
contract, as the bidder»s terms were before the board for 
their inspection and favorable action was taken thereon.
"A written bid. need not be signed by both parties to be 
bound. The signature of one, the acceptance of the bid by the 
other, followed by shipment and delivery of the articles and 
their acceptance will constitute the binding executed contract."
Contract Awarded With Date of Completion Omitted in 
Advertisement Illegal. An advertisement should state the 
date of required completion of the contract in order to permit 
competitive bidding on a common basis. If an advertisement 17
omits this element as it did in Edmundson v. Board of Education. 
in which, as a result of the omission the bidders submitted 
dates ranging from October 1, 1915 to September 1, 1916, it 
was held that such an omission prevents computation of bids 
on a common basis. To open the element of the time of 
completion in proposals, it is easy to see how the door to 
the perpetuation of fraud may be opened. Bidders should be 
informed by advertisement or the specifications on file of 
those matters needed to enable them to bid Intelligently. 
ii ' " 11Edmundson v. Board of Public Education of School D^st. of
City of Pittsburgh, (1915) 9̂  A. 348, 348, Pa. 559.
Boards May Act Independently of Advertisement When No
Statute Requires Advertising:. In states where there are no
statutes requiring competitive bidding and a board of education
proceeds to advertise for proposals anyway, a board may act
independently of the advertisement as long as it acts in rood
faith and with reasonable discretion. The New Jersey case
18Kraft v. Board of Education well illustrates this point. Bids 
were submitted in response to an advertisement for furniture. 
Several sample desks were displayed by the various bidders and 
the board finally decided to adopt the Saunders desk at 4.45 
instead of the desk at the lowest bid. This particular desk 
appeared to be well constructed, stronger and possessed 
certain features which made it appear to be a better value for 
the price than the others. The board acted in good faith and 
with reasonable discretion as any prudent man would do in a 
business transaction.
In Coward v. City of Bayonne a New Jersey case, a board 
was not required to advertise but it did, reserving the right 
to reject any and. all bide. The contract was aw rded to the 
second highest bidder for the installation of a heating and 
ventilating s stem, without reference to advertisement even 
though it contained a clause, "none but union labor shall be 
employed.'* The court explained follows:
Kraft v. Board of Rduc? tion. of Weekawken Tp. (1903) 51 A.




"Although the board did actually advertise for 
proposals, they were not required to award the contract 
to the lowest bidder; and the award of the contract to 
a higher or the highest bidder, or to some one. who 
did not bid at all, would not in the absenoe of bad faith and corruption, be regarded as such an abuse 
of that discretion conferred upon them by law as to 
justify interference by this court."19
In Ml8souls County Free High School v. Salth. a board 
of trustees of a county high school advertised for bids for 
the erection of a schoolhouse. The board accepted the 
lowest bid, that of Hightower for $134,736, but made some 
changes, omissions and alterations to reduce the contract 
price 24p00. Some taxpayers contended that this was a 
violation of the statute requiring bids, while the defense 
claimed the statute did not apply. There was no statute relat­
ing to school districts applicable to county high schools; 
each was operated under and was regulated by separate laws, 
hence the board in this case may act independently of the 
advertisement.
"A county high school can be created only by 
the county; its trustees are a county agency; property 
acquired for its purposes is county property; and any 
obligations incurred in its behalf is a county obligat­
ion. The provisions relating to school districts were 
not applicable to county high schools; each operated under and was regulated by separate laws."20
Statutes Do Not Apply to All School Districts. Some­
times a state statutes does not apply to all types of school 
districts and in order to know, one must study his own state 
statutes. Where the procedure of awarding contracts is 
I$3------------------Coward v. City of Bayonne (1902) 51 A. 490, 67 N. J. Law 470
Missoula County Free High School v. Smith (1932) 8 P.(2d) 800.20
17
illegal in one type of district, it may not be in another type.
In Minnesota we have a good illustration of this. The
statute applying to the purchase of school furniture, Sec.
2846, G. S. 1923, applies only to common and independent
district and not to special school districts.
“There are three classes of school districts, 
common, independent and special. The latter class 
consists of those district^, which were created by 
special laws prior to the constitutional amendment 
prohibiting the enactment of such special laws.
The act creating defendant board of education as a 
special school district gave it full power to erect 
schoolhouses and to purchase any personal property 
necessary for the schools. The act contains no 
provision reqTiiring the board to advertise for or receive bids." 21
In special cases the district must adopt an act by
22referendum before it ap lies.J
A Board Heed Not Advertise For Personal Services. It
is not necessary to advertise and receive bids for the
preparation of plans and specifications to be used in advertls-
23
ing for and receiving bids for any work. The states of Indiana, 
24 25 26 27 28
California, Tennessee, North Dakota, Minnesota, and New York
3Y------ -- -------
Merritt v. Hughes (Minn. 1928) 320 N. W. 164.
32Horton et al v. Board of Education of Borough of Oradell et al 
(1928) 143 A. 218 (N. J.)
23Crese v. State (Ind. 1926) 152 N. E. 823.
34Harris v. Cooley (Calif. 1915) 152 P. 300, 171 Calif. 144.
25State v. Brown (Tenn. 1929) 21 S. W. (2d) 721.
^^Rosatti v. Common School Dist. No 96 Cass County (1925) 204 
N. W. 833, 52 N. D. 931.
North Dakota School Law 1931, Ch. 235, Sec. 2.
27Krohnberg v. Pass (Minn. 1932) 244 N. W. 329.
°®Kiehm v. Board of Education of City of Utica (1921) 190 N. Y. S. 
798, 198 App. Div. 476.
18
have all had oases Involving the legality of hiring the services 
of an architect without competitive bidding. In all cases it 
has been decided that statutes do not require that notice shall
be published and bids received for the work calling for
personal services. This not only includes architects but also
29 30 31
includes engineers, inspectors, and superintendents, of con­
struction.
Neither need a contract for a site for a school building
be submitted to competitive bidding as explained in State v.
Brown. It was charged in that case that the board of education
entered a contract with architects for the consideration of
6$ and also selected a site which incurred unnecessary expense
for sidewalks, sewage, etc., proceeding without competitive
bids. It was further charged, in this case, that equally
as good architects could be secured for the consideration of
4$. The reasoning of this case is quite typical of similar
oases and is quoted as follows*
"In our opinion, a general requirement that contracts made by a public commission or committee 
be submitted to competitive bidding does not apply 
to the contract for the ourchase of a particular 
piece of land selected as the site of a proposed 
public building, nor to a contract for the personal services of an architect."33
Opal. Is Not Included In Supplies. Coal is not considered
^Krohnberg v. Pass (Minn. 1933) 244 N. W. 329 
30Hibbs v. Arensberg (1923) 119 A. 727, 276 Pa. ">4.
31Creas v. State (Ind. 1936) 153 N. E. 822.
32State v. Brown (Tenn. 1929) 21 S. W. (2d) 731.
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as sup lies and not intended to be included as sup lies. In 
the purchase of fuel, gradation of quality of coal, heating, 
oapacity, adaptability to heating apparatus, and experience 
and skill of persons managing school furnaces are essential 
facts to be considered in making the selection. Broad 
discretion is reposed in a board of education and the accept­
ance of other than the cheapest will not be enjoined where
34a board has acted in good faith.
Award of Contract Must Be Within Reasonable Time After 
Advertising. The advertisement for bids does not legally 
extend beyond the period for the awarding of the first 
contract. Legal requirements are not met if a contract is 
not executed by the lowest bidder , and then later a contract 
is awarded to the next lower bidder with the date of
35
completion later than that specified in the advertisement.
The acceptance of a bid must be within a reasonable time after 
advertising.
The plans and specifications do not necessarily have to be 
submitted and approved by authorized officers before the bids 
are called for by advertisement, but it would be better practice 
to do so, and thus avoid possible complications or delays in 
case they are not approved. As long as approval is secured
36before contract is executed the statutory requirement is met.
33White v. Moore (1927) 136 A. 318, 288 Pa. 411.
S4Gosline v. Toledo Board of Education (1908) 30 Ohio Cir. Ct.R. 503.
35Mulcahy v. Board of Education (1928) 159 N. E. 324, 250 
Ohio App. 492.




10 May Submit Bi^s. A sufficient number of copies of
plans and speciflcations must be prepared so that all prospective
bidders who make application may secure copies as intended by
the statute. To fail in having enough copies may allow fraud
and favoritism to enter, since a limitation of the number of
copies may enable a combination of bidders to secure all of
1
them and prevent competition from any outside bidders. No
school officer shall be personally interested in any contract
requiring the expenditure of funds except as provided by 2
the statute.
In North Dakota to entitle a contractor to a copy of the
plans and specifications for construction of a public building
amounting to more than the sum of 3,000 such contractor must
have maintained an office within the state for at least one3
year prior to the date of his request.
There are no legal requirements regarding the qualifications 
of a bidder but often home contractors -re preferred.
A board of education cannot practice what is known as 
"pre-qualification of bidders," defined as the determination 
of a contractors competency and responsibility to satisfact­
orily complete a given construction project before he submits
•̂ Hibbs et al v. Arensberg et al, (1923) 119 A. 727, 276 Pa. 24. 
2North Dakota School Law 1931 Sec. 134-9.
3North Dakota School Law 1931 Ch. 195, Sec. 3.
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his bid. In the ca-e of J. Weinstein Building Corporation v. 
Sooville. the advertisement for bids for the erection of a 
schoolhouse requested submission of a financial statement and 
an experience questionaire with the application for a copy of 
the plans and specifications; without stating the purpose of 
these in the advertisement. The court ve the following 
reasoning*
"The statutory requirement of competitive 
bidding is for the protection of the taxpayers, 
and is based upon the theory that competitive 
bid ing will reduce prices. However, praiseworthy 
the motives of the board of education of the City of Mt. Vernon, it has clearly erred in its attempt 
to prevent competition by limiting those who may compete. "4 *
Submit Bid To Whom. Proposals or bids are usually 
submitted to the clerk of the school district, or secretary 
of the board of education in the city, where the contract is 
to be executed, but a board of education may appoint a building 
committee and delegate the authority of advertising and receiv­
ing bids to them. A board may delegate ministerial duties 
but not discretionary. In School District No. 13 v. Western 
Tube Coaeany. it was alleged that the board did not advertise 
for bids for the heating apparatus as required by statute, 
because the building oommittee advertised, reoeived bids, and 
awarded the contract, but the court stated:
4J. Weinstein Bldg. Corp. V. Sooville (19 2) 254 N. Y. S. 384,141 Miso. Rep. 902.
"The purpose of the statutory requirement was 
complied with, if, indeed, the compliance was 
literal, taking the two statutes together. We are not inclined to accent the technical construction 
contended for. The advertisement of the com .ittee 
was accepted by the board, as well as its award 
of the contract; and in the resoect the two bodies... 
board and com ittee...combined in the award. There 
was a sufficient advertisement for bids to award the contract."5
In Schwitzer v. Board of Education, a committee handled 
the advertising, accepting of bids, opening of bids and reading 
of the bids and it was held that,
"The function of advertising was purely 
ministerial or administrative, and could be properly 
delegated. Those changes in specifications were 
minor and within the' specifications to that effect 
and did not affect the heating, lighting, ventilating 
or other hygienic conditions, nor to any other matters 
regulated by sehool law. The rules of the board 
directed the committee to "advertise for bids for the 
required work as directed by law," secondly the action 
of the committee was ratified by the board. 6
Bids for the adoption of textbooks are submitted to the 
State Superintendent of Instruction, County Superintendent 
or other persons having official capacity as Secretary of 
the Textbook Commission according to the statutes of the 
various states. North Dakota has no state adoption of text­
books hence there are no contracts for books awarded on 
competitive bidding.
Formality of Bids. A bid must conform to the advertise­
ment in all respects that are material and essential to meet 
"5 " 1 " . . 1 " 1 1,School Diet. #3 Carbon County v. Western Tube Co. (1905) 80 P.155, 13 Wyo. 304.
6Schwitzer v. Board of Education of City of Newark (1910) 75 A.447.
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the requirements of the state statutes; in the case Perkins v. 
Bright the bids for the erection of a schoolhouse were sub­
mitted and a oontract awarded and entered into by a bidder 
whose bid was in the form of #6,950, as the amount for 
materials, #6,950 for labor, and the total $6,950. The 
statute required that bid should be stated separately when 
both labor and materials are embraced in the work bid for, 
none but the lowest bid shall be accepted, and any part of 
a bid which is lower than the same part of any other bid, 
shall be accepted. The bid was too informal for acceptance.
“To place the figure at the same amount for 
both labor, material and the total thereof is in 
utter disregard of the letter, spirit, and intent 
of the section of the statute in question, and 
subversive of its purpose." 7 8
If sample or specimen copies are required by a statute, 
and only thirty printed pages of a textbook are presented 
with the bid, the bid was held not in compliance with the 
statute.
"As the words "Sample Copy" and Speoiraen Copy" so well convey their own meaning, no reason is per­
ceived for resorting to any other means of arriving 
at the sense in which they were intense* by the Legislature to be understood. "8
In Waxnock & Zahrndt v. Wray. it was claimed the bid 
of the Bareham & McFarland, Inc was informal and should be 
rejected on the grounds of naming the Sturtevant Company,
7Perklns v. Bright (1923) 141 N. E, 689, 109 Ohio St. 14.
8State Text-Book Commission v. Weathers (1919) 213 S. W. 207, 184 Ky. 748.
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but before they were opened, this correction of bis fomer bid. 
made M s  $900 lower than the next bidder to whom tbe contract 
was awarded, Tbe board refused to accent tbe corrected bid 
on tb© grounds that it constituted an illegal bid in not being 
accompanied by a certified check and was received after tbe 
closing date, but it was held that tbe correction did not 
constitute i new bid and was not informal in not being 
accompanied by a check as it was merely a modification of bis
former bid which in all resnects met tbe legal reouiraments.
12
In Tooele v. Tooele High School District #1. tbe contract 
was awarded to a bidder whose bid was not accompanied by a cert­
ified check as orovlded by tbe statutes. An effort was made 
to set aside this contract as being illegal but here tbe 
court held that as tbe contract bad been entered into and a 
bond furnished, tbe charges were not sufficient to warrant 
error as tbe board acted in good faith and tbe check was 
immaterial.
Bidding on Alternates. In advertising for bids the board 
of education often desires to ret bids on several dif ferent 
makes, brandf , or tra.de marks which they have in mind. In 
order to secure several estimates to choose from in their 
final deliberations, the advertisement must contain clauses 
invitin bids on the alternates. Alternates meaning a second 
choice ox substitute.
ISTooele Bldg. Ass’n v. Tooele High School Bist, #1 (1913)
134 P, 894, 43 Utah, 362.
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Amerioan Blower Com any, and the Clarage Comoany as subcontract­
ors and manufaotuerers of the fans, with the option of the 
bidder of selecting the company, also the word none was used 
in place of ciphers in amounts for alternates to be added or 
subtr cted. The olaintiff specified only the Sturtevent 
Company in his bid on heating and plumbing and claims the right 
to the contract. It was held not informal as to require reject­
ion because of failure to bid on the alternates.
“The school is not being constructed for the 
benefit of contractors but for the benefit of the 
city, and the specifications and rules of the board and the bids of contractors must be construed 
accordingly. It is the interest of the city that 
is the determining factor, provided the statutory 
provisions relating to the letting of contracts 
have been observed. The irregularities complained 
of, however, do not violate the principle of 
competition which the statute requires."9
A bid quoting the price, "at just what it costs to lay
them down," is too indefinite, and no award can be made thereon.
However, the omission of two articles of insignificant value
such as a knife, eraser and a bottle of ink in a bid for a
large amount of supplies which contains all of the other articles
advertised for, does not render the bid unacceptable when it is
10otherwise in proper form.
11
In Zimmerman v. Miller. the plaintiff handed in a 
correction of his bid after the time set for accenting them, *13
Warnock & Zahrndt v. Wray (1928) 230 N. Y. S. 681, 132, Misc. Rep. 882.
^State of Nebraska ex rel Whedon v. Com'rs of York County (1882)
13 Neb. 57, 12 N. W. 816.
Zimmerman et al v. Miller et al (1912) 85 A. 871, 337 Pa. 616.11
The submission of a bid containing two alternative clauses
not called fox in the specifications, does not affect the
legality of the award of a contract to the lowest bidder, as13
Illustrated in the case Pugs ley v. Board, of Education. The 
Gallo Brothers submitted the lowest bid of $36,488 but added 
two alternative olauses of 550 and *450 more to the above.
The plaintiff was next lowest bidder for #37,460. The accept­
ance of either alternate would still make the Gallo bid the 
lowest.
In Sbbeson v. Board of Public Education the board of 
education accepted the Francis Company bid of #409,000 or 
#414,500 on alternatives when Herzog’s bid was for #405,000 
or #408,000 on the sa e alternatives. The specifications 
required that both sub-contractors and men employed must be 
bonaflde residents of Delaware; give names and addresses of 
sub-cntractors and that certain sash devices to be manufact­
ured by Lond & Burnham Co. The lowest bidder failed to comply 
with the condition requiring the use of Delaware sub-contractors 
in the erection of the sohoolhouse, and it was held that the 
acceptance of a higher bid was proper*
"The cases hereinbefore cited lead inevitably to 
the conclusion that the sort of regulation which the 
board laid down and which is here objected to is ^
beyond the condemnation of any constitutional inhibition. 14
26
^Pugsley v. Board of Education of Mine Hill Tp. (N. J. 1925) 130 A. 822.
14Ebbeson v. Board of Public Education in Wilmington (Del.1931) 
156 A. 286.
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It is not necessary for a bidder to submit a bid on all
the alternatives in the specifications for example in the case
15
of Farrell v. Board of Education, the specifications for the 
new school called for proposals, for the heating and ventilat­
ing work and equipment, upon the basis of a base bid and thirty- 
four alternates, it was not necessary to bid on all thirty- 
four alternates.
The method of awarding construction contracts on the
alternate "for the work to be done on a cost, plus basis
with a maximum cost," has practically disappeared, A few states
have legislation prohibiting this method. For those interested
in learning more about this method it is suggested to refer to
16the case Bauman City of West Allis.
Bidding on The Aggregate. In all construction work there 
are two parts, the furnishing of materials, and the furnishing 
of labor. Sometimes it is more economical to award separate 
contracts for these items and again sometimes a greater saving 
can be made to award one contract to a firm furnishing both 
labor and materials.
The term 'aggregate' as used in inviting bids, means the
combination, or total of both labor and materials. The case
17
Hudson v. Board of Education illustrates and explains the use
IB -------------------------Farrell v. Board of Education of Town of West Orange in 
Essex County (N. J. 1932) 157 A. 656 10 N. J. Misc. R. 88.
16Bauman v. City of West Allis (1935) 204 N. W. 907, 189 Wis. 506.
Hudson v. Board of Education of Wheelersburg Rural School 
District, et al (1931) Ohio (1933) 179 N. E. 701.
17
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of the term quite well. Two separate buildings were to be 
constructed by the board of education of Wheelersburg, Ohio.
It is alleged that the contract was not awarded lawfully 
to the lowest responsible bidder. The board awarded the contracts 
for both buildings to the bidder whose aggregate of both build­
ings was lowest and not in two separate contracts where a 
saving of $247 could be made.
The court reasoned as follows: The term "lowest in the 
aggregate," within the statute providing for acceptance by the 
board of the lowest responsible bid for construction work, 
relates to aggregate bids for labor and material. The board 
cannot let contracts for two different buildings to a bidder 
whose aggregate bid is lowest, if contracts with responsible 
bidders might be entered into for a less sum by contracting 
separately for each building. Any part of a bid which is
18lower than the same part of any other bid, shall be accented 
where bids state the labor, material and total separately.
Openipg: and. Reading Bids. A bid should not be opened 
until the day and hour specified in the notice and then only 
by those authorized to do so, neither should the contents of 
any bid be made public until the time when all bid received 
shall be publicly opened and read aloud and recorded in the 
minutes.
A Committee pay Be Ap olnted To Handle Ministerial Duties. 
■^Perkins v. Bright (1923) 141 N. E. 689, 109 Ohio St. 14.
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A board of education may delegate to a committee the duty of
preparing and submitting specifications, and of conducting
negotiations for the contract, provided the results of the
negotiations axe considered by the board before the award of 
19 20
the contract. In The Mayor and City Council v. Weathereby.
the bids were opened by a committee of six appointed for the
purpose. It was claimed that the committee unlawfully opened
and awarded the contract to Cunningham whose bid was higher
than that of Teathersby. Later Weathersby received a contract
from the Mayor and City Council who have legal authority to
enter such contract,
21
I*1 Schwitzer v. Board of Education, such boards or 
committees representing them shall give public notice of the 
time and ulace, where and when such bids shall be received, 
and at such time and place they shall immediately proceed to 
unseal and publicly announce the contents of the bids in the 
presenoe of bidders choosing to attend and make proper record 
of the prices and terms in the minutes. Held that the award 
of a contract will not be vitiated by the mere failure of the 
oommittee receiving the bids to publicly read certain alternative 
estimates, where it appears that such course was pursued with 
the consent of the bidders, and where the bids themselves were 
•f§’.. .............
Kraft v. Board of Education of Weeh^wken To. (1902) 51 A. 483, 
67 N. J. Law 512. 201
20Mayor and City Council v. Weathersby Md. (1879) 53 Md. 442.21Sohwltzer v. Board of Education of City of Newark (1910)75 A. 447.
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publicly read, and no fraud is claimed or indicated. Also an 
award of a contract for tie building of a sohoolhouse made 
by a city board of education was not unlawful because a 
committee of tie board duly authorized by its rules advertised 
for, received, and opened the bids, it appearing that the 
committee after opening the bids, reported to the board as a 
basis for its action.
22
In Tpnner v. Nelson it was held that there was sub­
stantial compliance with the statute requiring the convention 
to meet and publicly open and read the proposals. The bids for 
furnishing schoolbooks were voluminous, and contained large 
catalogues, price lists, etc., and on the first day of the 
session the bids were publicly opened, and the introductory 
portions of each bid, and the communication accompanying them, 
were read, then the proposals were referred to committees on 
tabulations, and were open to the inspection of all persons 
interested therein.
"To read everything contained in the pamphlets 
and catalogues would require an unreasonable length 
of time, no one would be benefited by lengthy reading, 
no one was injured by not reading them, and the intent­
ion of the law is to insure fair and impartial con­
sideration of proposals."
A Cannot Be Withdrawn After Acceptance. In People
255" '
v. Board of Education, a contractor bid of l?94,000 submitted 
January 12, was the lowest bid for the construction of a new 2
2 s
Tanner v. Nelson State Supt. of Public Instruction (1902)70 P. 984, 25 Utah 226.
People ex rel Connor’s v. Board of Education of City of New 
York (1921) 188 N. Y. S. 686, 197 Ad . Div. 5, judgment 
affirmed 134 N. E. 550, 232 N. Y. 510.
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building, but this was not within the amount appropriated by 
the board of estimate and apportionment. The board adopted a 
resolution subject to favorable action of the board of estimate 
and apportionment awarding contract to said contractor. On the 
thirty-ninth day after the submission of the bid, the board 
awarded the contract to the contractor, and on February 19, 
relator wrote withdrawing his bid because of an increase in 
cost of work and requested the return of the deposit. This 
the board refused to do. Action was then brought to recover 
the deposit. The court ruled as follows:
"The only theory on which the relator would 
be entitled to withdraw his bid and to the return 
of his deposit is that the defendant took an un­
reasonable period of time in considering the award 
of the contract, but I deem it quite clear that it cannot be so held."
An Attempt To Correct An Prror Poes Wot Constitute With- 
Drawal. An attempt to correct an error in the bid does not 
constitute a withdrawal of a bid nor a refusal to contract.
In Cedar Ranids Lumber Co. v. Fisher. when Fisher was notified 
by telegraph "You are low bidder. Come on morning train." He 
informed them that be had made a mistake in his figures, they 
communicated to him their desire to change the specifications 
by using more expensive material than specified. The board 
did not call upon him to contract in accordance with his bid, 
nor did it give him a chance to refuse to do so, but the board 
proceeded to contract with a third party who did not bid and 
declared that the deposit was forfeited.
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"The action of the hoard did not make a completed 
contract. Telegram was insufficient to constitute an 
acceptance. There was no refusal to contract on the 
part of the bidder so as to authorize the forfeiture 
of the deposit accompanying the bid. Board has no 
right to reject all bids and enter into a oontract 
with a nonbidding party, and then recover of the 
lowest bidder the difference between his bid and the 
price at which the oontract was let."24
Re usal to Enter Altered Contract Not g. Withdrawal.
Refusal to enter a contract containing matters not in the
specifications does not constitute a withdrawal or refusal
to contract so as to forfeit deposit. Smith v. St. Louis
County Second School District illustrates this point:
Smith’s bid was the lowest, was accepted, and the board
voted to award him the contract. The architect for the
school district drafted a contract based on specifications
but it was not delivered, so the attorney for the school boaxd
drew a new contract varying from the specifications. The parties
were unable to agree on a contract so the school bo-rd let the
contract to another bidder, and refused to return the deposit.
Action was brought to recover the deposit. It was held:
"It is not necessary to refer in detail to the 
various drafts of proposed contracts, as it is clear 
that the minds of the parties did not meet and that 
no contract was ever agreed upon. M:j0
Check Forfeited Ut>on Refusal of Bidder to Enter Contract.
36In Independent School District '102 v. Farmer * s & Merchants
u3edar Rapids Lumber Co. v. Fisher May et al (1906) 105 N. W. 
595, 129 Iowa 332, 4 L. R. A. NS 177.
p RSmith v. St. Louis Co. Second School District (1909) 108 Minn. 323, 122. N. W. 173
26“ Independent School Diet.#102 of Pennington Co. v. Farmer's 
& Merchants State Bank of Thief River Falls (McAdams, 
Intervener) 1922 190 N. W. 539.
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State Bank. McAdams was the lowest bidder on a new schoolhouse 
to be erected. He did not sign nor execute contract nor file 
surety bond, but notified the school board of an error in his 
bid. An effort was made to adjust the error, the board offered 
him the proposition of an additional payment equal to the 
amount of the error and an extension of time but the surety 
company refused to issue the necessary bond. MeAdams tried to 
dispose of the entire affair and asked for a return of the 
check which the board, declined to do. Action was brought to 
compel the bank to cash the check on which the payment was 
stop ed. It was held, "that the check was a part of the bid, 
to be forfeited if the successful bidder failed or refused to 
enter into a contract on the acceptance of his offer." This 
was an attempt to withdraw a bid which constituted a refusal 





•Alter* means to change, vary, modify, transform or to 
beoome different. As used in this study, It refers to the 
difference between the bid and the contract awarded upon the 
basis of that bid.
Wherever statutes require that contracts be awarded upon 
competitive bids, it is essential that all bidders be treated 
alike and that no favoritism, fraud, or corruption be -resent.
It is the purpose of this chapter to set forth the rules 
governing the alteration of bids and to describe and illustrate 
the limitations upon boards of education in the awarding 
contracts upon altered bids.
Alterations May Be Ms.de When No Statute Applies. In the 
absence of statutes requiring the advertisement for letting 
contracts upon competitive bidding and the board does advertise, 
a board may make changes, alterations and omissions as they
1
see necessary. In Missoula County Free High School v. Smith 
the contract price was reduced $34,000 and since there was no 
statute prohibiting or regulating the procedure the court 
could not interfere.
When a statute requires the letting of contracts by the 
bid procedure a board of education may not change, alter nor 
omit any essential part to increase or decrease the contract
Missoula County Free High School v. Smith (Mont. 1933) 8 P.
(3d) 800.
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price. In Criswell Board of Education, after opening the 
bide for the erection of a scboolhouse according to certain 
specificatione, tbe pl?5ne were changed to reduce the cost of 
the building about $6,330. This was deducted from the lowest 
bid and a contract was awarded. During the progress of 
construction the board changed plans to install a more 
expensive heating plant, allowing $1500; extra work was ordered 
on the foundation and #892.50 was allowed; numerous other 
minor changes were made by the contractor for his benefit 
without the knowledge or the authority of the board, and these 
changes were estimated at flSOO. It was held, that the contract­
or and the architects colluslvely and fraudulently changed the 
plans and specifications and substituted inferior materials in 
the course of construction in order to obtain an excessive and 
dishonest profit. The reasonable value of the completed 
building was |2Q,535.56 and that common honesty requires that 
the board should pay the reasonable value thereof.
"Where the plan remains substantially the same 
and the parties act in good faith, detail features, 
which are not necessary to the building, and which 
do not change the substantial character of it, may 
be eliminated on terms agreeable to the board and 
the bidder entitled to the contract upon the plans as advertised. Where a proper deduction from his 
bid is made on account thereof, such a change in the 
specifications would not be ultra vires of the board.
There is no evidence of any bad faith on the part at the board or the defendant Grant in this respect."®
....... .............................
®Criswell v. Board of Directors of Everett School Dist. No.24.
(1904) 75 P. 984. 34 Wash. 420.
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In Rj£ Chester School District Audit action was brought
to stop alleged illegal expenditures. The architect was
authorized by the board to order extra work when necessary
and to increase or diminish the contract orice accordingly;
it was held that the school directors may without complying
with the statutory requirements of public notice and
competitive bids authorize minor changes in the original
contract not constituting and independent undertaking.
"A new departure must not vary from the original plan to be of such importance as to constitute a new 
undertaking, which the act controls, and where fair­ness could only be reached through competitive bidding."3
In Pennsylvania the statute requiring bids is mandatory
for all contracts in excess of #300 even though the board had
authority to contract for a job of installing new windows for
#390 and after work was commenced it was found that extra work
had to be done because of the rotten lumber in the old frames.
The additional work necessary to repair the old frames would
bring the cost in excess of #300; hence the board was required
to submit such work to competitive bidding.
"The use of the word ‘shall’ leaves no room for 
the exercise of either option or discretion on the part of the board in softer as contracts exceeding 
the amount stated are concerned."4
Refusal to Fnter Altered Contract Does Wot Forfeit Deposit. 
A board may not accent a bid which does not conform to the
y . — - .....  ..... ..... . ......... .
°In Re Chester School Districts Audit (1930) 151 A. 801, 301 
Pa. 203.
^Summit Hill Directors, in re (1917) 102 A. 278, 358 Pa. 575.
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specifications and enter into a contract which calls for the
date of completion differing from that in the advertisement
nor may a bid which does not conform to specifications be
changed or corrected after opening of the bids. If a board
changes the specifications it cannot hold the lowest bidder
5to the contract and deolare the deposit forfeited.
Contract Hot The Bame as Original Bid Is Void. In Soola
v. Board of Education, a board of education could not modify
the specifications by changes and award the contract to a former
bidder, though the lowest. The contract was for erecting a
central heating plant according to the revised specifications,
at a price less than the original bid.
"Indeed this rule that a contract must conform 
to the specifications is one so essential to the 
preservation of the policy to be carried out by 
competitive bidding that it has been recognised when­
ever the matter has been brought under judicial notice." ° 7
In State Mathis Brothers Co., the board was not allowed 
to proceed with the award of a contract for installation of 
heating and ventilating system upon a bid not based unon the 
original specifications and received subsequent to the 
designated time in the advertisement. To award a contract in 
this manner is wholly unauthorized, illegal and void. *67
fc " 1°Cedar Rapids Lumber Co. v. Fisher, (1906) 105 H, W. 595. 129 Iowa 332, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 177.
Smith v. Independent School Dist. Ho. 12, St. Louis County 
(Minn. 1910) 123 H. W, 173, 108 Minn. 322.
6Scola v. Board of Education of Town of Montclair (1908) 71 A.299, 77. N. J. Law 737State ex rel Mathis Bros. Co. v. Cincinnati (Board of Education) 
1905 27 Ohio Cir. Ct. 832.
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Error Cyxnot Be Corrected After Bide Are Opened. Because 
of an alleged mistake on the part of a bidder a board of 
education cannot allow him to correct his error and thereupon
award him the contract even though he is the lowest bidder.
8
In McGreevev v. Board of Education, plaintiff thought that the 
plans for the excavation for a schoolhouse were drawn to the 
scale of one-fourth inch equaled one foot instead of one-eighth 
inch equalling one foot; he was permitted to modify his bid 
after they were opened and considered. By allowing a bidder to 
change his bid after seeing other bids leads to favoritism and 
violates the regulations. Citizens should know the limitations 
of boards before entering contracts.
Contract Void If Date of Completion is Changed. In the 
case of Mulcahy v. Board of Education, the lowest bidder was 
prevented from entering the contract because of a suit by a 
taxpayer. The board, over four months later, without re­
advertising awarded the contract to next lowest bidder with the 
date of completion, September 1, 1925 as specified, changed to 
July 1, 1926. Quote:
"No bids having been received for the completion 
of the building by 1st. day of July 1926, there was no 
competitive bidding for the contract, which was awarded. 
(Plans and specifications provided completion September 
1, 1925.) A bid is an offer, and, where the time that 
such offer shall remain open is not provided in the bid, 
or by law or in the advertisement or specifications, it of course remains open for acceptance a reasonable time, 
and what is a reasonable time depends upon the circum­
stances in such care, and, if the bid is not accepted
‘ ' ' ...................11McGreevey v. Board of Educ tion (1900) 20 Ohio Cir. Ct. 114, 100 C. D. 734.
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within a reasonable time, the offer may be considered 
by the bidder as withdrawn, end the public body receiv­
ing the bid cannot thereafter hold such a bidder to 
his bid."9
Contr ct Void If Penalty. Insurance. Surety Bond Are 
Omitted. To waive the penalty for failure to complete a 
contract within the specified time, to omit workmen*s compen­
sation insurance, and to substitute an individual surety for
10
a surety bond, render the contract void. A contract awarded 
with such alterations is void owing to fraudulent conduct on 
the part of the bidder and failure to comply with the statutes.
To make any changes or alterations in a contract, good 
faith and common honesty demand a re-advertisement with notice 
of a new condition.
A modification of a bid to omit items in order to bring 
the cost within the funds provided is improper, but in the 
execution of an incompleted contract delayed because of 
uncontrollable factors, such alterations necessary to the ful­
fillment thereof is not Illegal as was pointed out in People 11
v. Craig where the installation of the heating and ventilat­
ing system was delayed for over two years because of defaults 
of the contractor in charge of construction,
“Confronted with such condition it was not only 
within the power of the board of education to secure a modification of the contract, but a duty so to do 
was essential to advance the cause of education." *10
®Mulcahy v. Board of Education (1928) 159 N. E. 324, 350 
Ohio Apt>. 492.
10Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v. Summit Hill School Dist. (1937) 
137 A. 140, 289 Pa. 75.
^People ex rel Wells & Newton Co. of New York v. Craig (1921) 
232 N. Y.125 133 N. E. 419, reversing order 1 9  N.Y.S 324,
197 App. Div. 407.
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All Bidders Must Be Acquainted ith Plans Unon 1?hieh 
Contract Is Awarded. A bidder cannot submit a bid on bis own 
plan and specifications and enter a valid oontract as tbis 
would constitute a variation from tbe plans advertised for 
competitive bidding. All bidders would not be acquainted with 
tbe specifications in tbeir entirety by tbis method. Tbe case 
Kay v. Board of Education relates bow the American Steel 
Company offered to allow a reduction of $3,500 if tbe height 
of thet aeement we e lessened, and submitted tbeir own work­
ing plans and specifications, which indicated tbeir s stem and 
which had been ap roved by the architect seventy two hours 
before the opening of the bids.
*1 think it is clear from this testimony that 
competitive bidding for the ooncrete work was nut 
upon different bases. A public board charged with 
the duty of obtaining bids for public work, after advertising, and of awarding a contract for it to 
the lowest bidder, will not have discharged its full 
duty in that regard where, after the bids have been 
received and opened, but before it has formally taken final action upon the bids, it agrees with the 
then lowest bidder to diminish the amount of the _0 
work in consideration of the reduction of the bld.,,io
State Building Code Must Be Obeyed. Hot only must a
oontract agree with the plans and specifications announced in
an advertisement upon which bids were received but it must
also conform to the state building code. This is a legal
requirement.
Kay v. Board of Education of Kearny (1912) 83 A. 954, 83 
N. J. Laws 551,
12
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"That a ceiling nine inches higher than provided 
for in the plans and specifications would entail an 
additional expenditure cannot be denied. This would 
result in the destruction of the benefit of competitive 
bidding. We are of the opinion that the board of 
education should be required to proceed in accordance 
with the law and the requirements of the code, rather 
than permit the construction of a building which 
would result in virtually the erection of a nuisance 
under the statute, requiring changes to he made after 
its erection t an additional coat and expense. Court 
cannot modify the plans and supervise the construction 
In accordance to the laws.*lu
T*--------- — *.. .Benzing v. Board of Education of Hamilton City School 
District (19"2) 181 I. E. 150, 41 Ohio Apo. 468.
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CHAPTER VI
AWARDING CONTRACT TO BIDDER
A Contr ct Can Be Awarded For a Reasonable Time Only After 
Opening; Bids. A board of education can hold bidders for the 
erection of a schoolhou.se to bids only for a reasonable time, 
where no time is specified. In Mulcrhy v. Board of Education. 
the board of education received bids on July 22, 1924 for the 
construction of a school building to be completed by September 
1, 1925. On August 26, 1924 the contract was awarded but the 
successful bidder was prevented from executing said contract 
because of a suit by a taxpayer. Thereupon the board on 
December 30, 1924, awarded a contract to another bidder and 
provided that the completion be July 1, 1926. A taxpayer 
challenged the validity of this latter contract.
"No bids having been received for the completion 
of the building by 1st. day of July 1926, there was no 
competitive bidding for the contract, which was awarded. 
(Plans and specifications provided completion Sept. 1, 
1925) A bid is an offer, and, where the time that 
such offer shall remain open is not provided in the 
bid, or by law or in the advertisement or specifications, 
it of course remains open for acceptance a reasonable 
time, and what is a reasonable time depends upon the 
circumstances in each case and, if the bid iB not 
accepted within a reasonable time, the offer may be 
considered by the bidder as withdrawn, and the public 
body receiving the bid cannot thereafter hold such 
bidder to his bid.B^
Continuation of a, Contract Boes Not Const!tute The Award 
of & New Contract. Another case differing somewhat in details
1Mulcahy v. Board of Education (19~8) 159 N. E. 324, 250 Ohio 
App. 492.
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held that the agreement to continue work under contract was not 
a new contract which could not be entered into without bids*
This case, People v* Craig. involved a delay in completing a 
contract to install heating and ventilating apparatus due to 
defaults of contractors having charge of the construction of 
the building. The relator was prevented from proceeding with 
the work for about two years, when he announced a refusal to 
longer be bound by the contract ufcless paid for extra expense 
incidental to delays.
"Confronted with such condition it was not only 
within the power of the board of education to secure 
a modification of the contract, but a duty so to do 
was essential to advance the cause of education."2
Proper Notice Must Be Given Successful Bidder. Usually 
the clerk of the school district notifies the successful bidder, 
but any member of the school board if authorized to do so, may 
assume the responsibility. It is advisable to make all accept­
ances of bids in writing. 3
In Grant v. Board of Education. the chairman instructed 
contractor to proceed with the work hid upon. Upon completion 
of the job of grading and fil ing in two cellars adjoining 
echo ;lhouse, the contractor presented his bill based upon #7 
per day for laborer and 19 per day for a truck and laborer.
Payment was refused on grounds that the work was not
$................ ............ ......................People ex rel Wells & Newton Co. of New York v, Craig (1931) 
'233 N. Y. 125, 133 N. E. 419, reversing order 189 N. Y. S.
334, 197 App. Div. 407.
3Grant v. Board of Education of City of Bayonne (N, J. 1927)
136 A. 713.
properly authorized. It was proved that it had been customary
for the chairman to receive estimates and give the job to the
lowest bidder. It was held that the board of education was
liable to the contractor for work under a bid accented by
unauthorized agent, held out by the board as having authority.
A telegram, "You are low bidder. Come on morning train."
notifying a bidder does not constitute a completed contract
nor an acceptance of the bid, in the case Cedar Rapids Lumber 
4Co. v. Fisher. Neither does a conditional acceptance of a
bid obligate a school board to award a contract. Where a
notice to a contractor in Clark v. Board of Education, was
qualified as follows: "The acceptance of this bid is also
subject to financial ability," and later the board notified
bidder of the withdrawal of award of contract to construct a
building because there was not an appropriation for this purpose.
The contractor then sought to recover for the loss of profits
of being prevented from performing an alleged contract. It
5
would be ultra vires for the board to either accept any bid for
said work or to award any contract for it which was in excess
of the amount available.
"There was no acceptance of this bid. It was a 
conditional acceptance, which the board has no right to 
make, because it exceeded the amount which had been 
appropriated by the board of estimate and apportionment 
and the board of aldermen." 6
^Oedar Rapids Lumber Co. v. Fisher (May et al) 105 N. W. 595,129 Iowa 333, 4 L. R. A. (N.S) 177.
5,1 Ultra vires" means, acts beyond the scope of authority.
®T. A. Clark Co. v. Board of Education of City of New York (1915) 
142 N. Y. S. 106, 156 Ape. Dov. 842, 109 N. E. 1093, 215 N. Y. 
646.
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The acceptance of a bid does not constitute a contract.
In Weitz v. Independent District of Pea Moines. Weitz*s bid 
was accented and he was notified; later the board discovered 
another lower bidder was responsible and Weitz was prevented 
from fulfilling the contract. The law required letting to the 
lowest responsible bidder. A contract with Weitz, who was not 
the lowest responsible bidder would have been void.
MIf plaintiff was not the lowest bidder, and did 
not furnish the bonds required, the statute conferred 
no power upon the directors of thed efendant to contract 
with the plaintiff. No contract existed for building 
the house.unless the written instrument had been executed,"7
Another case Johnston Heating Co. v. Board of Education 
is similar to the above except that a contractor was notified 
by an unauthorized agent. The agent of the contractor sub­
mitted a bid for installing a beating and ventilating system. 
On the night of opening the bids, the board agreed to aocept 
his bid if bonds were sold, this was the lowest bid and it 
was entered on the minutes of the board. Bellows, a board 
member was supposed to have notified the contractor's 
representative of the board's acceptance. At a subsequent 
meeting the board rescinded its acceptance. The question was, 
“Did the communication of the acceptance by Bellows constitute 
a contract and was the contractor's bid properly accepted?"
, r, „r T",r r , I ,m„
Weitz v. Independent District of Des Moines (iOwa 1890 )Iowa 423, 44 N. W. 696.
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"In the absence of an authorized notice of 
acceptance of plaintiff’s bid, the board had a perfect 
right to rescind its resolution accepting plaintiff’s 
bid. The question of the legality of the boards action 
in accepting some other bid in piece of plaintiff’s is 
not now before the court. We simply decide that the 
board’s action in revoking its acceptance of plaintiff’s 
bid was quite witbin its legal right. ”8
Awarding Contract to Lowest Bidder. In general a school
board is given wide discretion in awarding a school contract,
but there are times when no discretion is allowed and the
9
award to the lowest bidder is mandatory.
Use of Shall Leaves No Room For Exercise of Discretion.
10In New Jersey, Homan v. Board of Education, the statute 
provided "All contracts shall be awarded to the lowest 
responsible bidder." The board could not claim the date of 
completion as an excuse for the award to a higher bidder, just 
because the bidder had delayed the completion of prior contracts 
with the board. In Oklahoma the case Hannafe v. Board of 
Education sup orts the same view even more emphatically. The 
Statute required letting to the lowest responsible bidder. The 
board awarded a contract for installation of a heating and 
ventilating system to the highest bidder and Homan who had the 
lowest bid brought an action for an injunction to prevent the 
execution of the contract. The court’s comments were as follows
I in ir  1" *  1 i t r  T i  [1 w  “  ' "  i  1 " 1 - 1
Johnston Heating Co. v. So rd of Education, Union Free School 
Dist. 6, Marthas set, Town of North Hempstead, Nassau County 
(1916) 161 N. Y. S. 867, 175 Ap p . Div. 140.
9Briody v. DeKimpe (1917) 10S A. 688, 91 N. J. Law 206.
10Homan v. Bo ird of Education of Camden, N. J. (1925) 127 A. 834.
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“The law requiring contracts to be let to the 
lowest responsible bidder is based upon public economy, 
and originated perhaps in distrust of public officers 
whose duty it is to make contracts. It is of great 
importance to taxpayers, and ought not to be frittered 
away with exceptions. Contracts made in violation of 
it have been held void and re think rightly.* 11 *
Bo: rd Cannot Pass Over Lower Bidder Without Substantial 
Reason. In another Few Jersey case Jacobson v. Board of 
Education a contract for coal was awarded to the highest bidder. 
The board declared that the lowest bidder was not responsible 
but the second lowest bidder's responsibility was not attacked. 
The actions of the board aroused suspicions of fraudulent 
conduct. The contract it was held was not awarded in accord­
ance with the requirements of the statute for the following 
reasons:
“The board of education was aware of the fact 
that there were two bidders lower than the person to 
whom the contract was awarded, and they should have 
been prepared to state their reasons for passing over 
both of these bidders. Indeed they were bound to 
state some reason, and they only undertook it with 
reference to the nroseoutors. Since the oontract was 
not awarded in accordance with the requirements of 
the statute, it must be set aside." 1*3
Lowest Bid Must Be Accepted ’ hen "’oard Shows Favoritism. 
Where, the statutes require sohool authorities to let construct­
ion contracts to the lowest bidder sueh authorities cannot by 
means of a provision in the notice for bids, arbitrarily
11Hannsn v. Board of Education of City of Lawton (1909) 107
P. 646, 25 Okl, 372, 30 L. R. A. (F. S.) 214.
Jacobson et al v. Board of Education of City of Elizabeth 
et al (1906) 64 A. 609 (F. J.)
12
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reserve the right to reject bids submitted. In Arensmever-13
Warnock-Zsxndt v. Tray. the board was forced to re*-advertise
because the first advertisement failed to specify wrought iron
or steel. A contractor submitted the lowest bid on wrought
iron pipes, in response to the second advertisement, but the
board decided to reject all bids and advertise again, the third
time. The evidence made it appear that the board deliberately
attempted to reject the contractor’s bid. Such a practice if
permitted would lead to favoritism, corruption, extravagance,
and Improvidence in violation of the intention of the statutes,
so a mandamus was "ranted to the plaintiff, ft appeared as
though the board was attempting to keep on re-cdvertisIng till
a favorite firm hap ened to be the lowest bidder.
Award to Lowest Responsible Bidder is Mandatory Hot
Discretionary. In Pennsylvania to let a contract to the lowest
responsible bidder is mandatory not discretionary. In Schuck
14
v. School District. the board voted to award a contract to the 
bidder who was fourth lowest, the board determined that the 
lowest bidder was not responsible but they did not investigate 
the responsibility of two other bidders.
A board must exeroise sound discretion according to the 
standards fixed for the protection of the public and cannot act 
capriciously as if expending their private funds. An award must 
be made to the lowest responsible bidder after careful
Tg*1,1 **' .... . """......... .... "" 1,Arensmeyer-Warnock-Zarndt, Ino. v. Wray et al Board of Ed. 
(1922) 194 N. Y. S. 398. 118 Misc. Re. 619. 14
14Schuck v. School District of Baldwin (1929) 296 Pa. 408, 146 A. 24
investigation of a bidder's financial standing, renutation, 
experience, resources, facilities, judgment and efficiency as 
builders.
Board Must Exercise Discretion. It is usually within the
power of a school board or officers to exeroise their discretion
in determining the lowest responsible bidder, but cannot exercise
such discretion to accomplish fraud.
Discretion as applied to public functionaries, means the
power or right to aot officially aocording to what appears
just and proper..,that is use "deliberate judgment." Officers
prompted by a fraudulent purpose in awarding a contract cannot
15be said to be exeroising discretion.
If Boards Exercise Discretion They Cannot be Held Liable 
For Difference Between Bid Accepted and The Lowest Bid. In 
Stapleton v. Trussell. the school directors advertised for bids 
for the erection of a eohoolhouse and accepted one, not the 
lowest. Action was brought by Trussell on behalf of the taxpay­
ers to recover from the school directors the difference between 
the bid accepted and the lowest bid. It is alleged the district 
suffered a loss by not accepting the lowest bid. It was held
that the statute did not arbitrarily require that the lowest
16bid be accepted.
"As specified in the law, their power in making 
such contracts is general, and in the absence of
------------- .................-  —
School list. #2 of Silver Bow Co. v. Richards et al (1922)
205 P. 206. (Mont.) 62. 141.
16Stapleton v. Trussell, (1917) Texas 196 3. W. 269.
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so
limitations they are required merely to aot faith­
fully and in the exercise of their best judgment 
so as to best serve the interest of their district.”
Acceptance of Higher Bid Hot Invalid in Absence of Statute 
•Where Board Uses Discretion. In Chandler v. Board of Education, 
it was alleged that the school board In rejecting Chandler’s 
proposal was without any good, valid or legal reason, but that 
it was rejected arbitrarily, and without reason assigned therefor 
and the action of the board in rejecting It and accenting another 
was invalid. No restraint is exercised to prevent the board 
from accepting a higher bid where the board reserved the right 
to reject any and all bids and there was no evidence of fraud 
on the part of the board and no statute requiring contracts to 
be awarded to the lowest bidder.
"The statutory provision requiring the contract 
in such oases to be let to the lowest bidder is designed 
for the benefit and protection of the public, and not of the bidders.”
A board of education is not required to accept the lowest 
or any bid where it reserves the right to reject any and all 
bids, and no mandamus will be issued compelling them to do so 
as so well expressed in the following case of Anderson v.
Board of Education, where the contract was awarded to another, 
though Anderson’s bid was the lowest. It was held that the 
board merely solicited for proposals and the reason for the 
rejection of plaintiff’s bid was Immaterial,
p--------------- - —
Chandler v. Board of Education of City of Detroit (1895)
104 Mich. 293, 62 N. W. 370.
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"As such it did not lay the foundation of e- contract. 
The plaintiffs bid was a proposal to build, which the 
defendant, by the terms of its statement, had the right 
to reject. No claim is advanced in the petition looking 
to a recovery for fraud or deceit in making the proposals 
for bids. It is, indeed, asserted that the defendant rejected the plaintiffs bid "without cause, arbitrarily 
and capriciously, through favoritism and bias." But, if the defendant had the absolute right to reject any 
and all bids, no cause of action would arise to 
plaintiffs because of the motive which let to the 
rejection of their bid. The right to reject the bids 
was unconditional. Defendant was entitled to exercise 
that right for any cause it might deem satisfactory, or without any assignable cause." 18
It is Not Always Necessary to Accent Lowest Bid. In 
Kemp v. Sedalia. Kemp was awarded the contract to do some 
cement work, he began work and was then notified that his 
contract would be rescinded. This w s done and Kemp was 
prevented from completing the contract. The work was then 
let to another whose bid was lower but forgotten and overlooked 
when the contract was let.
A school district cannot escape liability of a contract 
because of the neglect of one of its agents at the time of 
letting, in not presenting a lower bid, since a board can 
legally make a contract even though a lower bid has been before 
it.
"This only leaves the question whether defendant 
can on account of the neglect of one of its agents, annul, at its own will, a oontract which it was 
authorised to make with another who was innocent of 
all fault, and escope a liability in damages* We 
think it cannot. This contract was one it could
Yo' " ' 1 " r' 1111" "Anderson v. Board of Education (Mo. 1894) 1^2 Mo. 61, 27 
S. W. 610, 36 L. R. A. 707.
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legally make and even though the other bid had not 
been forgotten and was lower than plalntiff*s, still 
the board may have many proper cons Idera ions for 
referring plaintiff’s bid." 19
Responsible Bidder Means More Than Fine actally Responsible.
The term “responsible" as applied in "lowest responsible bidder,"
means more than mere financial responsibility but includes
integrity, skill, ability, and capacity to perform that ^art- 
30
icular work. To determine the responsibility of a bidder the
board of education should investigate the bidders to learn of
their financial standing, reputation, experience, resources,
21
facilities, judgment and efficiency as builders.
It is usually within the power of a school board or officers
to exercise their discretion in determining the lowest respon-32
sible bidder and their judgment is final. The determination 
of the body authorized to accept bids upon proper proceedings 
that a bidder is not responsible is final, and will not be 
disturbed unless it appears that the action was in bad faith, 
or that the proofs were such as to satisfy reasonable men of 
the bidder’s responsibility.
In the exercise of discretion the board of education, in
the absence of statutes, may award a contract notwithstanding23 24
the bid is not the lowest. In Bowers v. School Bo-rd a school 
Tq------------------&erap v. School District of City of Sedalia (1900) 84 Mo.
App. 680.
30Ellingson v. Cherry Lake School District (1927) 212 N.W. 773.
31Hibbs et al v. Arensberg et al (192) 119 A. 737, 276 Pa. 24o oSchwitser v. Board of Education of City of Newark (1910)
75 A. 447.
33Goss v. Board of Education of City of Chicago (1928) 247 111. App. 58.
243owers v. School Board (Pa. 1875) 2 pears. 227.
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board promised to award a contract for the erection of a 
sohoolhouse to the lowest bidder, but gave the contract to one 
whose bid they considered the best. Bowers claiming to be 
the lowest bidder was not entitled to an injunction restrain­
ing the board from awarding the contract as stated in the 
absence of proof of corruption or bad faith.
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CHAPTER VII
JUDICIAL ORDERS ON ACCEPTING RIDS
Injunctions. An injunction is a judicial order prohibiting
something, an action brought to restrain, enjoin or prevent the
performance of some act or the execution of a contract.
Ordinarily, any taxpayer in the school district may seek
an injunction and challenge the validity of an alleged illegal
contract, and it will invariably be granted where there is
proof of fraud or violation of the statutes.
Priaa Facie Evidence of Fraud Sufficient For an Injunction.i
In School Dig rict ,'-3 of Silver Bow Co. v. Rich rds. the5” “
evidence showed a prima facie case of fraud. The majority of 
the board did not exercise deliberate judgment and discretion, 
but were prompted by a fraudulent purpose. Richards and Chinn 
two board members met with an agent of the Connell Co., and 
assumed to enter into a contract for a piano, victrola, needles 
and records for #663.45. The Instruments were delivered. There 
had been no meeting of the board and no bids had been called for. 
The plaintiff, the third member of the board, protested and bids 
were oalled for. As a results two other companies submitted 
lower bids, but Richards and Chinn voted to award the contract 
to Connell Co. Evidence showed that Richards and Chinn gave 
no consideration to bids other than that of the Connell Co.
^School Dist. ' '2 of Silver Bow Co. v. Richards et al (1922)
205 P. 206 (Mont.)
2Prima facie-means at first view or appearance of business.
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The piano and victrola were of inferior quality and not worth 
the purchase price. The evidence showed a prtma, facie case of 
fraud. The majority of the board, it was held, did not 
exercise deliberate judgment and discretion but were prompted 
by a fraudulent purpose.
Violation of Statute Sufficient for an Injunction. When
the statute requires that the award of a contract shall be to
the lowest responsible bidder and If the board proceeds to
award a contract in direct violation thereof, an injunction
will be granted. When there is an attempt to change the plans3
and specifications or the clans are indefinite for competitive
bidding on a common basis, an injunction will be granted to
prevent the execution of an illegal contract.
4
In Hannan v. Board of 'Education. Hannan a contractor, 
submitted the lowest bid for the installation of a heating and 
ventilating system and the board proceeded to award contract 
in violation of the statutes to a higher bidder. Action was 
brought to restrain the execution of the contract. It was 
held that the purpose of awarding to the lowest responsible 
bidder is to secure economy and guard against collusive contracts 
or favoritism. An injunction was granted.
Alterations SufiIcient Pause for an Injunction. In
5Lehigh Goal & Navigation Go. v. Summit Hill School Bis-rlet.
^Scola" v. So:'xd “of ' Education of Town of Montclair (1908) 71 A.
399, 77 N. J. Laws 73.
Edmundson v. Board of Education of School District of City of Pittsburgh (1915) 94 A. 948 Pa. 559.
4Haiman v. Board of Education of City of Lawton (1909) 107 P.646, 25 Okl. 372, 30 L. R. A. (N.S.) 214.
5Lehigh Co-1 & Navigation Co. v. Summit Hill School Die riot (1927) 137 A. 140, 289 Pa. 75.
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the hoard advertised for bide for the erection of a school 
building and the contraot was not let to the lowest bidder. 
Changes were made so as not to comply with the specifications 
of the advertisement, by eliminating the requirement that a 
contractor maintain workmen’s compensation insurance, and the 
surety bond was modified by substituting an Individual surety. 
This was in direct violation of the statute and the contract 
w s declared void.
Lack of Discretion Sufficient For Injunction. A board
of education must give reasons for passing over lower bidders.
To award a contract to a higher bidder not in accordance with
the statutory reouirements renders a contract void and it6must be set aside.
No Common Basis For Bidding Sufficient For an Injunction.
An injunction will be granted, if there is no common basis for
competitive bidding, such as an advertisement failing to state
the date of completion or an architect failing to provide a
suf icient number of copies of clans and specifications for
7
all those who express a wish to bid.
Ao.cc-Qt.-nce of an Illegal Bid Cause for Injunction. If
the date of completion of a contract is extended a contract
8is invalid and an injunction will prevent the entering. If
the award of a contract is based upon an illegal bid such as 
g----------- -DJacobson et al v. Board of Education of City of Elizabeth et al (1906) 64 A. 609. (N. J.)
7Hibbs et al v. Arensberg et al (1933) 119 A. 727, 276 Pa. 24.
8Mulcahy v. Board of Education (1928) 159 N. E. 324, ^50 Ohio 
App. 492.
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one received subsequently to the closing date, as Is illustrated9
by the case St gyle of Nebraska v. Comraisg loner of York County . 
a bid submitted was not only illegal beoause of being filed 
late but also because the bid quoted the price *at just what 
it cos fee to lay them down.*
Injunction Will Not be Granted ■■hen iward is Lcgral. An 
injunction will not lie to restrain a sobool board from award­
ing a oontraot to one who is not the lowest bidder where a 
board reserves the right to reject any and all bids, and there
is no evidence of fraud on the cart of a board, and no statute
10requiring contracts to be awarded to the lowest bidder.
Neither will an Injunction be granted if a bid is the lowest11in the aggregate and a board in its discretion accepts it.
T.axur.yer,a Hua.t Exercise Due Diligence to Obtain an
Injunction. Hie right to obtain an injunction to prevent an
illegal expenditure of school funds will not be granted if
accusers do not use due diligence in bringing a suit and are
12 13
guilty of Inches. In Connors v. City of Lowell. the taxpayers
two years and seven months after the completion of a building
attempted to restrain payment on an ultra vires contract which
10Chr.ndler v. Board of Education of City of Detroit (1895)104 Mich. 393, 62 N. W. 370.
■^Gilbert v. Board of Education (1901) 31 Ohio Cir, St. R.416, 11 0. C. D. 552.
12 'Laches* means not taking action at enportune time.
Connors v. City of Lowell (1933) 140 N. E. 743, 246 Mass. 27913
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had been entered into without legally advertising for bids and
upon modified terras and specifications. Because of this delay
in bringing an aotion the taxpayers showed a lack of due
diligence so an injunction was denied.
Injunction Will Not Lie When Board Exercises Discretion.
No injunction will be granted where an award of a contract
substantially complies with the statutes and a board has
exercised discretion when there is any doubt as to the14
interpretation of the law.
Injunction Will Prevent Evasion of the Law. When it oan
be shown in awarding contracts that there is an intention to
avoid the statute an injunction will be granted to prevent
the execution of such Illegal contracts. The board of
15education in J£n gg Summit Hill, Directors directed work to be 
done and then several separate bills were rendered each 
under $300, so as to evade the law requiring all expenditures 
involving #300 or over to be submitted to competitive bidding. 
The statute in Pennsylvania is mandatory and school officers 
cannot deliberately disregard the requirement that contracts 
over $300 be awarded to the lowest and best bidder.
Errors in Bid. As a general rule when a mistake is made 
in a hid the treatment depends ur>on its importance. If the 
error was not Incidental but fundamental and a substantial
•^Gilbert v. Board of Education (1901) 31 Ohio Cir. St. R. 416, 11 0. C. D. 553.
15Summlt Hill Directors, In Re (1917) 102 A. 378, 358 Pa. 575.
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part of the whole consideration of the contract, upon settle­
ment of actual damages sustained the parties can be cut in 
, . 16"status quo 1 not meaning that one shall profit out of the 
mistake of another. Insignificant errors of little importance 
that any reasonable person might make are disregarded.
Payment of Re-Advertising Will Put Parties in Status Quo. T?
In Kutsche v. Ford.. Kutsohe submitted the lowest bid for the 
erection of a new school building and a letter was mailed to 
him notifying him of the fact that he was awarded the contract, 
Kutsche noted the omission of his cost of plastering which 
amounted to #6,400 so he telephoned to the architect and told 
him of the error, Kutsche wrote a letter to the clerk of the 
school board and left it with his housekeeper, but it was 
never delivered. The board met the following week, cashed the 
check of #3,200 and advertised for new bids. The refusal of 
Kutsche to enter the contrast made the new bid necessary. It 
was held that a mistake of #6,400 was fundamental and the 
plaintiff should have relief. Likewise in Board of Regents 
of Murray State Normal School v. Cole. where Cole’s bid being 
the lowest was accepted and several hours later he discovered 
an error in his figures in omitting #32,000 for out stone. He 
declined to execute the contract and secure a bond. The board 
forfeited the check and advertised for a second letting. Cole 
was again successful bidder. He was awarded the contract and
16---------------------"Status quo" means as it was.
17Kutsche v. Ford et al (1923) 192 N. W. 714, 222 Mich. 442,
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work was commenced. The failure to execute the first contract 
entailed some additional expense, so action was brought. Here 
it was held as in the previous c se that the mistake was not 
incidental and fundamental and a substantial part of the 
whole consideration of the contract. Upon payment of 200 
actual damages the parties can be put in status quo.
"There is no doubt that appellee made an honest 
mistake in his bid, and it does not appear that he was guilty of culpable negligence. It was such an 
error as any business man might make. The only way 
in which appellant has been prejudiced is in the cost 
incident to the second letting. Upon payment of this 
leg appelle (Cole) the parties may be placed in status quo and all the conditions of the rule of the cancell­
ation of the instrument fairly met. 1,18
An Error Corrected Before Bids Are Opened la not Illegal.
In another case involving an error in a bid submitted,
19
Zimmerman v. Miller. Zimmerman discovered his error before the 
date set for opening bids, and he sent in a corrected bid 
before the bids were opened. This correction of his former bid 
made his $900 lower than the next bidder to whom the contract 
was awarded. The board refused to accept the corrected bid on 
the grounds that it constituted an illegal bid, received late 
and not accompanied by a certified check. Here the board used 
discretion. There is no doubt but what the board made a 
mistake in determining the legality of the corrected bid, and 
the grounds for letting the contract to a higher bidder.
^ 3 ------------------- --------------------3oard of Regents of Murray State Normal School v. Cole. (1925) 
273 S. W. 508, 209, Ky. 761.
19Zimmermen v. Miller (1912) 85 A. 871, 237 Pa. 616.
There was nothing further the plaintiff could do as a mandamus 
could not be granted compelling acceptance of his bid when 
the board had exercised discretion.
Deposlt Forfeited if Error Cannot be Adjusted and Bidder 
Refuses Proposition. However, there are two cases on record 
where the deposits were forfeited; one in which the bidder 
refused to enter contract and enter contract and the other 
because of Irenes. In Independent School district /102 v . 
Farmer's £ Merchants Ste.tr dank. McAdams was the lowest bidder 
on a new school house to be erected. He notified the board 
of an error of #1200 in his bid. He refused to sign or execute 
the contract or file a surety bond. He made an effort to adjust 
the error, so the board offered the proposition of an extension 
of time and an additional payment of #1,200. The surety 
company knowing that this would be an illegal contract refused 
to issue a bond, so McAdams tried to dispose of the entire affair 
by asking for the return of this deposit which the board declined 
to do. The bank refused payment so the board re-advertised for 
bids and brought an action to recover on the check. Held that 
there was no abandonment of contract by mutual agreement. The 
board did attempt to relieve the situation but McAdams-failed 
to comply with the conditions. The check is a cart of the bid, 
to be forfeited if the successful bidder failed or refused to 
enter into a contraot on acceptance of his offer.
■gfi" — .......... . 11 1Independence School Diet. !{r102 of Pennington County v. Farmer's
& Merchants State Bank of Thief River Fails. (192?) 190 N. W.
539, 153 Minn. 353.
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Dsasu ^  sag. *»
Contract!nr: Co. v. City of St. Paul. the contractor brought an 
action to recover #4,500 deposited with his bid for the
construction of a schoolhouee. He was unable to get bond 
upon the acceptance of his bid which was the lowest beoause 
the bonding company thought his bid was too low. Nearly three 
years later the contractor discovered an error of *17,941.70 
in his bid and claimed relief upon the forfeiture of his 
deposit. It was held that a contractor’s bid for construction 
of a school building and its acceptance constituted a prelimin­
ary contract which contemplated a later formal contract. A 
oontr ctor discovering a mistake in a bid three years there­
after was not entitled to relief against forfeiture of the 
deposit. "Promptness is a suggested condition of relief.
Good policy requires it."
Contract Not Invalid Because of Trivial Error. If an
error is an omission of so trivial an amount that it is 
incidental the error cannot be sufficient grounds to invalid­
ate a bid otherwise in proper form. In Nebraska there was a 
case of this nature where the bids were submitted to furnish 
offioers with sup lies containing books, blanks and stationery 
and miscellaneous articles. Whedon in this case submitted 
a bid including all the articles advertised for exeent one 
knife, eraser and a bottle of ink, otherwise the bid was 
3Y-------------- ---Federal Contracting Co. v. City of St. Paul (1929) 335N. W. 149, 177 Minn. 329.
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proper End was the lowest legal bid.
Mandamus. A mandamus is a juc:5ci 1 order commanding an
23 24
official to perform a specified act, such as to sign a contract, 
25 26 27
award a contract, approve a bill or warrant.
Mandamus Granted When Statute is Mandatory. When the
statute provides that "All contracts shall be awarded to the
lowest responsible bid'er," the lowest responsible bidder is
entitled to the contract, notwithstanding delays in completing
28
prior contracts; in Homan v. Board of Education. this was no 
legal excuse for not complying with the plain mandate of the 
statute.
A board of education cannot deliberately reject bids and
re-advertise but must award contract to the lowest responsible 29
bidder. Payment of a. bill cannot be refused when all legal
requirements of advertising for bids have been met and those
30contra cting hsve acted within their authority.
22
22State of Nebraska ex rel Whedon v. Corners York County (1882) 13 Neb. 57, 12 N. W. 816.
23Temple v. State (1916) 113 N. E. 233, 185 Ind. 139.
24“ Lincoln School Tp. of Hendricks County v. Union Trust Co. 
(1905) 74 N. E. 272, 36 Ind. Apw. 113.
25State v. York County Com'rs (Neb. 1882) 13 Neb. 57, 12 N. W. 816.
36Smith v. State Board of Control (193?) Calif. 10 P. (2d)736. 
27Harris v. Cooley (Calif. 1915) 152 P. 300, 171 Calif. 144.
In re Hanooloh McNutt Co. (1931) 247 N. Y. S. 539, 233 Ann. 
Div. 721.2ftHoman v. Board of Education of Camden (1935) 127 A. 824.
29Arensmeyer-'-'rnock-Zarndt, Inc. v, Wray (1939) 194 N. Y. S. 
798, 198 Apt). Div. 476.
30Smith v. State Board of Control (1933) Calif. 10 P. (2d) 736.
In Nebraska, a writ of mandamus was issued to compel an
accept nee of a bid that bad been ejected because of tbe omission
of two articles of insignificant value which did not invalidate
the bid, and to reject a bid filed subsequent to closing date
containing an indefinite nr ice stated "at what it costs to lay 31
them down."
A court will also grant a mandamus to compel a board of
education to accept bids from all who desire when there is an
unlawful attempt to restrict the number of competitors. To
indulge in a practice of eliminating inexperienced and
financially irrespondent bidders before receiving bids destroys
the intention of the statutes concerning ocmpetltive bidding,
32
however, praiseworthy the motives might be.
Mend a:.aus 17111 Hot Lie to Execute Illegal Contract. In
Hill v, Auerlean dock Co., Hill, the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, and Secretary of the Textbook Commission, refused 
to sign a contract awarded by the textbook commission ecause 
the American Book Company added the cost of establishing a 
central depository to the retail price charged for the books.
This was not done by any of the other companies* Hence a mand­
amus was held not to lie to compel the Superintendent of 
Public Instruction to execute the contract for the following 
reasons!
"The statute was pass'd for the benefit of people 
yi------------ ---- - •State v. York County Com'rs (Neb. 18 3) 13 Neb. 57, 13 N. W. 816.
•xoJ. Weinstein Bldg. Corp v. Scoville (1922) 254 N. Y. S. 384,141 Misc. Hep. 902.
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and. its main object was to furnish textbooks at the
lowest cost. The cost of the central depository should 
be paid by the publisher or contractor and should not 
be passed on to the users of the bonks in the nubile schools," S3
Warrant Must be Issued in Payment of legal Contract.
In He Randolph HcNutt Co., an action was brought for a peremptory 
mandamus order directed to the comptroller of the city of 
Buffalo requiring him to countersign a warrant for money due on 
goods furnished the board of education,. Refusal to sign was 
based upon the allegation that the specifications were man­
ipulated to shut out competitive bidding and showed favoritism 
and that specifications failed to designate quantities of 
particular furniture desired and time of delivery. Held:
* The city comptroller had no authority to re­audit the claim of petitioner, the claim having been 
properly audited by the board of education and the 
supplies having been brought for use in the public 
schools of the city and sufficient funds being on deposit with which to pay the bill." 34
Mandamus ?/ill Not Support an Illegal Act. A mandamus will
not be granted to compel the award of an illegal contract, based
on an illegal bid nor to the lowest bidder where an attempt was
made later to award on an illegal bid, nor where the board has
35the discretion to rejeot any and all bids.
Mandamus Will Not Compel Payment of Warrants Given on 
Contracts Over 500. A board may not enter small contracts to
34------------------------------ ~In Re Randolph McNutt Co. (1931) 347 N. Y. S. 539, 232, App. Div. 731.gcState v. Cincinnati Board of Education (1905) 27 Ohio Cir.St. R 832 —
State'v. Board of Education (1905) 37 Ohio Cir. St. R. 8?2.
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evade the statute but if the Jobe are distinctly separate and 
planned at different times, they are not illegal even though 
the sum total of all the jobs amounts to more than limit set 
by the statute.
There is a 1934 case in California bearing upon this 
question which is given in quite detail because of its recency. 
In Brown v. Bozeman the boerd of education undertook to make 
some improvements as follows: built movable bleachers for 
indoor baseball building, reconstructed floor and walls of 
handball court, erected new posts and backstops for the 
basketball courts, built four tennis courts, beautified the 
grounds with shrubs and plants, installed water pipes, grounds 
leveled and installed flood-lights for ball grounds and other 
courts. Tfie trustees did not advertise for bids. The total 
cost of all these improvements was #8,714.13. Warrants were 
issued for the payment of improvements none were over ‘500.
It is alleged that work was done in violation of the statute 
reeuiring advertising for bids. The defense claims that each 
improvement was a separate and distinct undertaking and did 
not require advertising for bids. Action was brought to compel 
the oayment of the warrants.
It was held, where the total cost of labor and materials 
used in a particular "job" for school purposes exceeds #500 a 
school board must advertise for bids; "jobs'* being piece of 
work done or to be done as a whole.
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"It should be impossible to segregate the items 
of the various accounts so that the cost of each "job" 
could be show. If this be done, the trial coart should 
order respondent Bozeman to approve such portions of the 
warrants involved in this action as are shown to have 
been for labor or materials used on any of the "jobs* 
not costing in excess of '”500. , end the respondent Rea 
to approve, allow, sign, and order the same paid. There 
is no good reason why any portion of any bill of a materialman such as the bill for the manual training 
department and other school supplies should not be paid- 
if it be shown that such bill w s legally contracted."013
■g-g- ----------*.. . . ■
Brown v. Bozeman (Oallf. 1934) 32 P. (3d) 168, 138 Oal. App. 13&
CHAPTER VIII
COURT ADJUSTMENTS OF ILLEGAL CONTRACTS
Whenever an illegal contract has been entered into 
invariably someone is goind to object and inevitably it will 
be left to the courts to settle. Of course a prevention is 
better than a cure and it is advisable that those in nubile 
office who have the authority to make contracts should be 
informed on the legal steps Involved. It is especially 
advisable for school directors to know the statutes of one's 
own state governing the awarding of school contracts if 
litigation is to be avoided.
Not only should public officers be intelligently informed 
in the legal steps involved in discharging the duties•intrusted 
to them, but every spirited citizen should know the limitations 
of the authority of school officials, and be a check tipon them.
Taxpayer Must Not Delay Action to Prevent an Illegal 
Expenditure. The first esse in mind is an action brought by 
ten taxpayers over two years after the execution of a contract 
to restrain an alleged illegal expenditure pertaining thereto. 
The description of this case is as follows: Walker was awarded 
a contract for the construction of a high school building by 
the building commission after rejecting the single bid which 
was made by Walker, received pursuant to the advertisement In 
a newspaper and without re-advertising for bids and without 
notice to the public of any change in the specifications. The 
contract was awarded upon terms differing in Important
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particulars from those on which, the oublic bids were invited. 
Connors, a taxpayer and bidder, objected to the award of this 
illegal contract in a letter to the chairman of the commission. 
Nothing was done to prevent the execution of it. The building 
had been completed for over two years and seven months when 
this suit was filed. There seems to be no question that this 
was an ultra vires contract end that one contracting with the 
building commission is bound by the limitations of the statute, 
but our taxpayers in this case delayed too long to nrevent an 
illegal expenditure of the atxpayers* funds. It is quite 
essential then that an action to prevent a wrong must be 
©zeroised at the critical time if any benefit will come of it.
"The plaintiffs did not use due diligence in bringing this 
suit and are guilty of laches."
"There was a delay of more than two years and seven 
months on the part of Conner’s after his letter to the 
chairman of the Commission asserting the illegality of 
the contract before filing of the bill in the present 
suit. The plaintiffs did not use due diligence in bringing this suit and are guilty of laches."2.
Contractors Cannot Collect on Executed Contracts That are
Illegal. Contracts awarded, in violation of the statutes are
known as ultra vires. acts beyond the scope of authority. As
a general rule a contractor cannot collect payment on an
illegal oontract regardless of the fact that the contract has
been executed and he is out his time, labor and materials.
^Connors v. City of Lowell (1923) 140 Iff. E. 742, 246 Mass. 379.
Contractor Cannot Collect for plastering? When Contract 
Was not Amerce cl on Competitive Bidding. There are three cases 
where illegal contracts were executed and the courts held to
the same opinion. A contractor cannot collect for work done2
on an ultra vires contract. In Beams v. Cooley. Reams built 
a schoolhouse and executed a separate contract for the plaster­
ing which was not inoluded in the construction contract nor 
advertised for competitive bidding. The superintendent of 
schools refused to approve a warrant of "531 in payment for 
the plastering. The statute specifies the limitations upon 
a board and even though it may work hardships upon individuals 
where the work and material has been furnished, nevertheless 
he is considered a mere volunteer and suffers only what he 
ought to have anticipated.
If Acceptance of Bid Is Hot in Writing Contractor Cannot
Collect for Work Done. In Meta v. Warwick. there was no written
contract nor written notice of acceptance of Warwick's bid.
Warwick bought materials from Metz in repairing and building
an addition to a sohoolhouse for which he did not pay, so an
attempt was made to collect from the surety of the bond. Here
it was held that the contract was ad initio and had no validity.
The surities could not be bound to guarantee the performance of
a contract that did not exist.
*r------------------°Reams v. Cooley (Calif. 1915) 152 P. 293, 171 Calif. 150, Ann. Cas. 1917 A.
3Metz v. Warrick (1925) 369 S. W. 626, 217 Mo. App. 504.
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Collection Cannot be Made For Work Done on Altered Bid.
A contractor cannot collect upon a contract where he was allowed 
to amend and increase hie bid after it had been opened, on account 
of an alleged mistake which did not appear on the face of the 
original bid. He though that the scale was one-fourth inch 
equal to one foot, instead of one-eighth inch. His bid was the 
lowest and was accepted. After discovering his error, he raised 
his bid end was still the lowest bidder. He entered a contract 
which was fulfilled and did extra work besides. He was paid 
some and then sued for the balance. It was held, that the 
contract was illegal and he could not collect even though the 
work has been done.
"While the rule may work hardship in particular 
instances or cases, no other rule would subserve the 
public welfare, and to hold otherwise would practically 
nullify this and similar statutes."4
Alteration of Bids Does Not Excuse Payment For a Reasonable 
Value. If a contract has been executed after changes, alterations 
and omissions have been made to reduce the cost, leaving the 
plan substantially the same and the parties have aoted in good 
faith by making reasonable deductions and additions accordingly, 
common honesty requires that the reasonable value thereof be 
paid, and such changes would not be ultra vires of a board.
In the Washington case Criswell v . Board of Education. 
the board of education advertised for bids for the ereotion of
cGreevey v. Board of Education (1900) 30 Ohio Cir. Ct, 114, 
100 C. D. 734.
a schoolhouse according to certain specificationa# After open­
ing: bids, tie plans were changed to reduce the oost of the build­
ing, The architect estimated that a saving of $6,230 could be 
made by modifying the plans. This amount was deducted from the 
bid of Grant who had the lowest bid and the contract was award­
ed to hiia for $$,230 less than his bid with the understanding 
that the schoolhouse was to be built according to the modified 
plans.
During the progress of construction the district decided 
to change the plans for the heating plant and deemed it 
advisable to install a more expensive one thus allowing 1,500,
The board ordered extra work to be done on the foundation for 
which #893.50 was allowed. In addition to these changes the 
contractor made numerous minor changes in the course of construct­
ion such as substituting cheaper and Inferior materials, without 
the knowledge or authority of the board. These changes were 
estimated to amount to about ?120) in favor of the contractor.
The question arose contesting the legality of this contraot 
and action was brought to stop the payment of the warrants 
issued in payment of this contraot.
The reasonable value of the completed building was estimated 
to be $20,535.56. Should payment be made to Grant when he and 
the architects who were agents of the board collusively and 
fraudulently ohan ed the plans and specifications and substituted 
inferior materials in the course of construction in order to 
obtain an excessive and dishonest profit? The court evidently
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believed that common honesty required the payment of the reason­
able value of the building in spite of the alterations, changes 
and modifications, and gave the following reasons:
"Where the plan remains substantially the same 
and the parties act in good faith, detail features, 
which are not necessary to the building, and which 
do not change the substantial character of it, may 
be eliminated on terms agreeable to the board and the 
bidder entitled to the contract upon the plans as 
advertised. Where a proper deduction from his bid is 
made an account thereof, such a change in the 
specifications would not be ultra vires of the board.
There is no evidence of any bad faith on the part of 
the board or the defendant Grant in this respect."5 *
Board Members May be Dismissed for Misconduct. Whenever
school officers make an Illegal expenditure, any taxpayer
within the district may protest; it is within his rights and
upon proof of corruption, favoritism, fraud or Incompetence
the member may be discharged. If more taxpayers would see
that board members acted within the statutes, maybe we would
soon have better qualified men in such offices, without the
necessity of legislation.
There are several cases where the courts have stepped in 
and dismissed board members from office for the exercise of
bad faith in the discharge of their duties.
6In School Diet. 2 v. Richards . the piano and v<ctrola 
case cited in Chapter VII, two board members Richards and 
Chinn were dismissed from office because of nrima facie 
evidence of fraud. They did not exercise deliverate judgment
5Criswell v. Board of Directors of Everett School Piet. No. 34 (1904) 75 P. 984, 34 Wash. 420.£*Sohool District #2 of Silver Bow Co. v. Richards et al (1922) 
205 P. 206 Mont.
and discretion, but were prompted by a fraudulent nuroose.
Connell, the third member of the board, who brought the case
into court to prevent this illegal expenditure deserves a
word of praise. He is more of the type of a board member we
desire and respect. Honesty and good Judgment are qualities
we should demand of all public officers.
In the ca e Jn Re Summit Kill Directors1 Removal evidence
did not necessarily prove that the officers committed fraud
but they acted capriciously and without reason in refusing
to let the contract to the lowest bidder. This was a direct
violation of the statute. They tried to evade the statute by
breaking up the contract in small parts with the intention of
evadin the law. This lack of deliberate Judgment was
sufficient cause for their dismissal.
"The use of the word “shall'’ leaves nd room for the exercise of either option or discretion on the part of the board, in so far as contracts exceeding
the amount stated are concerned.*’”
School directors cannot deliberately make contracts
involving amounts below statutory limit for the purpose of
evading statutory requirements, to do so is Just cause for 
8
removal.
There are times when a school board may believe that 
they have authority to enter a contract and go ahead in violation *8
'in Re Summit Hill School Directors’ Removal (1927) 137 A. 143, 289 Pa. 83.




of a by-law that the school board has adacted. Any contract 
awarded In violation of such a by-law is void.
"Persons dealing with a Municipal corporation are 
bound at their peril to know that the contracts made 
by the officials of such corporation are made in the 
mode pointed out by the charter and ordinances, end 
if they fail, they must suffer the consequences, The 
public interest demands, aside from any private con­
siderations , that we should hold that this by-law was 
mandatory in its nature, and compliance with it 
indespensable to the validity of any contract coming within its reach.b!
All contracts made in violation of a statute are void: 
The statute must be substantially followed:
"The statute must be substantially followed. If 
the board could dispense with others, and thus be left 
with no guide except its absolute will. The board is 
the agent of the public and intrusted with the duty of 
carrying out the mandates of the law in the matter of 
adopting textbooks for use of the children of the public schools."10
Montenegro-Riehm Music Co. v. Board of Education of Louisville (1912) 145 S. W. 740, 147 Ky. 720,




Advert lain. - for Bids. Statutes vary In length of time 
required for notices, see statutory requirements of your own 
state.
In general the advertising is done in the official county 
newspaper or by posting a notice in the three most public and 
conspicuous places.
The notice of, or advertisement for bids must be clear 
and definite to permit competitive bidding on a commoii basis 
and meet statutory requirements.
Advertisement must contain all of the es ential elements 
necessary for computation of bids upon a common basis.
Statutory duty cannot be delegated by a school board, but 
a committee may do the ministerial work if it is subsequently 
ratified by the board.
A contract is void if awarded in violation of a statute 
requiring advertising.
If a board advertises for bids when no statute requires 
them to do so, they may act independently of the advertisement 
provided they act in good faith and with reasonable discretion.
Re-advertisement is necessary where the contract is changed 
or altered from plans and specifications in the notice.
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Contents of the Bid. A bid must conform to specifications.
A contractor cannot change his bid after they have been 
opened.
An increase in the amount of a bid which has been accented 
even with the consent of the school authorities is illegal.
The deposit accompanying a bid is a guarantee of good faith 
and is for a penalty and not for a liquidated damages.
A corrected bid is valid if corrected before opening date.
Awarding the Contract. Where the notice reserves the right 
to reject any and all bids, they may le-adve tlse for bids.
A notice of acceptance of a bid must be communicated to 
the contractor by an authorized agent of the board.
Where the statute requires contracts to be let to the 
lowest bidder, authorities cannot arbitrarily reject the bids 
submitted.
A board must investigate the responsibility of bidders.
An award to a bidder not the lowest, cannot be made 
capriciously, and without reason.
A board must be prepared to show sufficient reason why 
the job was not given to the lowest bidder.
The term •responsible* is construed to include, integrity, 
skill, ability, and capacity to perform that particular work, 
character, responsibility, competency , reputation, experience, 
efficiency, facilities, resources, financial standing, judgment 
and the prices.
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The determination of the lowest responsible bidder by the 
authorities empowered to do so is final, and unless made in 
bad faith or arbitrarily or to accomplish fraud or favoritism, 
such judgment roust satisfy reasonable men.
Where a successful bidder refuses to enter a contract, a 
board c nnot let contract to a non-bidder, must re-advertise.
Adjustments of & Contract. An award of a contract on & bid 
received after the expiration of the time specified in the 
notice or advertisement is invalid.
Notice of a board meeting at which bids are to be con­
sidered must be given to all who are to act on the bids.
The cancellation of a contract is justified by a 
fundamental mistake in the bid, and the contractor is entitled 
to the return of the deposit.
The deposit is not forfeited upon an illegal attempt to 
increase the amount of a bid after acceptance by the school 
authorities but a board must give a bidder a chance to refuse 
to contract before forfeiture occurs.
To let contracts in violation of the statutes renders 
contract void.
Contractors should be familar with the limitations of 
school authorities.
Personal Comments and Recommendations. The individual 
elected to public office should be competent, honest, and 
im artlal. They should at all times place duty and the welfare
of the community above Individual feelings. In order to carry 
out the duties imposed upon them, only the best qualified 
individuals should be sleeted to be on a school board.
There have been many proposals for Improving the 
administrative system of our schools but very few states have 
gone beyond the stage that has always existed in respect to 
the qualification of board members.
In North Dakota the statute, Seo. 1153 of the General 
School Laws prescribed the qualifications of a sohool officer 
as follows:
"At any election of school officers in any school 
district in this state all persons who are qualified 
electors under the general laws of the state and all 
women twenty-one years of age having the necessary 
qualifications as to citizenship and residence required 
of male voters by law, shall be qualified voters and 
shall be eligible to the office of county superintendent 
of schools, school director, district treasurer, school 
district clerk, or member of the board of education, 
or may be judge or clerk of such election; provided, 
however, that the county superintendent shall possess 
the educational qualifications named in section 1122."
Note the only qualification required is, that he must be
a qualified voter. In other words to he a board member one
need not have attended one day of school in the United States,
not even have finished the first gra e; no educational
qualifications whatever. Is it any wonder that we have so
many grossly incompetent and corrupt individuals holding
nubile office to whom we intrust the spending of our public
funds raised by t axation?
Maybe there is just cause for the complaint about high 
taxes, but bow are we attempting to remedy the situation?
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Why don’t we start at the ooint where our efforts may do the 
most good? Too often we overlook the mismanagement of our 
board directors and think only of the salaries paid our teachers 
If only we would curtail the expenditures of school districts 
that have been made through fraud, comrotion, favoritism and 
lack of judgment maybe there wouldn’t be quite so much of a 
tax burden we hear so much about.
It is the purpose of this chapter to encourage voters and 
taxpayers to give a little more thought in their selection of 
public officers; to encourage the selection of the best 
prepared and Qualified individuals in their district for board 
members. Some of the questions that should be asked about 
every c ndidate for office axe:
What are hi© educational qualifications? Is he honest?
Has he a good reputation? What are his Ideals? Does he use 
good judgment? What success has he made in business? Will 
he discharge the duties of his office to support the American 
ideals of education?
The writer suggests that further study be made to determine 
the relationship between the systems of administration in the 
various states and the court decisions on bids. Some states 
have county boards of education or the county superintendent to 
approve the awarding of all contracts. An investigation may 
be able to discover advantages of county boards over the enact­
ment of statutes governing bid procedure.
Another interesting investigation might be made to study
81
the qualifications of board members in all of tbe cases studied 
to determine tbe advisability of nrescribing specific educational 
qualifications for school officers. The writer is of tbe 
opinion that tbe requirement of the completion of tbe eighth 
grade in tbe United States is advisable before anyone be 
permitted to hold a public office.
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